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Proving Sex-Plus Discrimination through
Comparator Evidence
Marc Chase McAllister*
This Article considers whether comparator evidence is required to
prove sex-plus discrimination, an issue that has splintered courts. Unlike a
pure sex discrimination claim, which alleges discrimination against males
or females as a whole, a sex-plus claim alleges discrimination against only
a particular subgroup of males or females, such as women with children,
based on both the plaintiff’s sex (e.g., female) and a “plus” factor (e.g.,
having children). Plaintiffs alleging sex-plus discrimination often attempt
to prove their claims with one of two types of comparator proof. The first,
referred to in this Article as “opposite sex comparator evidence,”
compares an employer’s treatment of the plaintiff to persons of the opposite
sex who share the same plus characteristic, such as evidence that an
employer refuses to hire women with children but readily hires men with
children. The second is “same sex comparator evidence,” which instead
shows how the employer treats persons of the same sex as the plaintiff wh o
lack the plus characteristic at issue, such as evidence that an employer
refuses to hire women with children but readily hires women without
children. Some courts, including the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, have
declared that sex-plus plaintiffs “can never be successful” without opposite
sex comparator evidence, while other courts, including the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, have rejected this approach. After examining this split,
this Article makes three claims regarding comparator proof in sex -plus
cases. First, this Article argues that a lack of comparator evidence is not
fatal to a sex-plus claim, as a plaintiff who lacks comparator proof may
still prevail in other ways, including through direct evidence of
discrimination. Second, this Article argues that in those instances when a
sex-plus plaintiff attempts to prove her claim with comparator evidence,
opposite sex comparator evidence is indeed a vital component because
without proof that the sexes were treated differently, no inference of “s ex”
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discrimination may arise. Finally, this Article argues that same sex
comparator evidence remains relevant in proving a sex -plus claim, and
that the strongest sex-plus claims are those that combine the two types of
comparator proof.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Unlawful employment discrimination occurs when an employer treats
an individual less favorably because of his or her protected characteristic,
such as her race. 1 Not all unfair treatment by employers is unlawful. 2
Rather, discrimination laws prohibit discriminatory treatment based on
certain designated characteristics. 3 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, in particular, prohibits discrimination on the basis of “sex.” 4
Because of the law’s equal employment opportunity objective, 5 the
“central question in any employment-discrimination case is whether the
employer would have taken the same action had the employee been of a
different race[, sex, etc.,] and everything else had remained the same.” 6
For this reason, employment discrimination claims are often proven with
evidence that the employer treated an employee in a protected class
differently than those outside the employee’s protected class, such as where
an employer promotes male but not equally-qualified female employees, 7
1 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (describing the “central
focus” in an employment discrimination case as “whether the employer is treating ‘some
people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin’”) (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977));
Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators,
60 A LA . L. REV . 191, 198 (2009).
2 See ELEVENTH CIR. P ATTERN J URY INSTR. - CIV . § 4.5 (2019) (setting forth a standard
jury instruction for Title VII discrimination claims stating that “[a]n employer may not
discriminate against an employee because of the employee’s [race/religion/sex/national
origin], but the employer may [discharge or decline to promote] an employee for any other
reason, good or bad, fair or unfair”).
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018) (making it unlawful for an employer “to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2018) (making it
unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of age); Americans With Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2018) (making it unlawful for an employer to
discriminate on the basis of disability). Other significant federal statutes include the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) (2018), which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of genetic information; the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2018), which states that Title VII’s prohibition against sex
discrimination applies to discrimination on the basis of pregnancy; and the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), Pub. L. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 794 (2012)), which prohibits discrimination against federal government employees
based on disabilities.
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
5 See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (declaring that Title
VII “requires that persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities
irrespective of their sex,” such that the statute does not permit “one hiring policy for women
and another for men”).
6 Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 158 (7th Cir. 1996).
7 See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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or imposes different requirements on similar employees of different races. 8
Subgroup discrimination claims, by contrast, focus on the employer’s
treatment of one segment of a protected group, such as married women,
rather than the group as a whole, such as all women (married or
unmarried).9
Sex-plus discrimination is one form of subgroup discrimination. 10 In
sex-plus discrimination scenarios, an employer does not discriminate
against all members of a protected class. 11 Rather, the employer exercises a
more specific sex-based animus targeting only a certain segment of males
or females on the basis of the employee’s sex and another “plus” factor, as
when an employer treats women with children differently than men with
children (usually due to the employer’s stereotypical belief that such
women, but not such men, will be bad employees). 12
8

See, e.g., Vazquez v. Caesar’s Paradise Stream Resort, No. 3:CV-09-0625, 2013 WL
6244568, at *4–5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2013) (explaining how the plaintiff, an African
American employee, brought a successful race discrimination claim where she was fired for
wearing her hair in braids while a white employee was not). See also Sullivan, supra note 1,
at 200 n.42 (stating that “disparate treatment [discrimination] can rarely be established
absent a baseline established by the employer’s treatment of members of the opposite sex or
a different race”).
9 See, e.g., Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)
(finding employer’s no-marriage rule for stewardesses to violate Title VII, and declaring
that Title VII “is not confined to explicit discriminations based ‘solely’ on sex,” such that
the statute encompasses “discrimination [that] adversely affects only a portion of the
protected class”); Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 331 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (W.D. Pa.
1971) (refusal to hire married women violated Title VII); Rauw v. Glickman, No. CV-991482-ST, 2001 WL 34039494, at *8–9 (D. Or. Aug. 6, 2001) (authorizing a sex plus marital
status claim under Title VII); Gee-Thomas v. Cingular Wireless, 324 F. Supp. 2d 875, 884,
888 (M.D. Tenn. 2004) (recognizing a sex-plus claim on the basis of sex plus marital and
family status, but ultimately dismissing the plaintiff’s claim because she failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact for trial on the issue of pretext).
10 See Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir.
1997) (recognizing that the “gender-plus” discrimination doctrine prohibits discrimination
not against women in general, but against subclasses of women).
11 See King v. Ferguson Enter., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1209 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (“To
succeed on a gender-plus claim, plaintiffs need not establish that their employer
discriminated against the entire class of men or women; instead, they need only establish
that their employer treated a subclass of men or women (those with the plus characteristic)
differently from those without the plus characteristic.”), aff’d, 568 F. App’x 686 (11th Cir.
2014).
12 See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544–45 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
concurring). See also Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1433 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that
in Phillips, “[t]he Supreme Court . . . adopted the proposition that sex considered in
conjunction with a second characteristic—’sex plus’—can delineate a ‘protected group’ and
can therefore serve as the basis for a Title VII suit”), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir.
1997); Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 2009) (discussing sex-plus
discrimination and concluding that, under Title VII, “an employer is not free to assume that
a woman, because she is a woman, will necessarily be a poor worker because of family
responsibilities;” rather, “[t]he essence of Title VII in this context is that women have the
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Because sex-plus discrimination is simply one type of “sex”
discrimination, 13 courts have recognized that a sex-plus discrimination
plaintiff must prove, at a minimum, that the sexes were treated
differently.14 And one common method of proving sex discrimination —
whether for a pure sex discrimination claim or a sex-plus claim—is through
comparator evidence.15 When such comparator evidence is used to prove a
sex-plus claim, however, courts are split over whether the proper
comparator must be a person of the opposite sex as the plaintiff who shares
the same plus characteristic (referred to in this Article as “opposite sex
comparator evidence”), or whether a plaintiff may instead prevail with
evidence regarding a comparator employee of the same sex as the plaintiff
who lacks the “plus” characteristic at issue (referred to in this Article as
“same sex comparator evidence”).16
After examining leading sex-plus cases, this Article presents a series
of proposals regarding the proper role of comparator evidence in such
cases. First, this Article argues that a lack of comparator evidence is not
fatal to a sex-plus claim, as a plaintiff who lacks comparator proof may still
prevail in other ways, including through direct evidence of discrimination.
Second, this Article argues that for any sex-plus claim proven through
comparator evidence, opposite sex comparator evidence is indeed an
essential component. Such comparator evidence is required, this A rticle
contends, because evidence regarding an employer’s more favorable

right to prove their mettle in the work arena without the burden of stereotypes regarding
whether they can fulfill their responsibilities”); Smith v. AVSC Int’l, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d
302, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that the “sex plus” theory “recognizes that it is
impermissible to treat men with an additional characteristic more or less favorably than
women with the same additional characteristic”).
13 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018) (making it unlawful for an employer “to . . .
discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex”) (emphasis
added).
14 See DeAngelo v. DentalEZ, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 572, 584 (E.D. Pa. 2010)
(recognizing that, “[a]t its root, . . . ‘sex-plus’ discrimination is simply a form of gender
discrimination,” requiring the plaintiff to present sufficient evidence of sex discrimination);
King, 971 F. Supp. 2d at 1209 (“Despite its name, the ultimate question in these cases ‘is
whether the employer took an adverse employment action at least in part because of an
employee’s sex.’”).
15 See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir. 2017)
(on a claim of sexual orientation discrimination, employing “the tried-and-true comparative
method in which we attempt to isolate the significance of the plaintiff’s sex to the
employer’s decision: has she described a situation in which, holding all other things constant
and changing only her sex, she would have been treated the same way?”). See generally
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 Yale L.J. 728, 744-45 (2011)
(noting that “comparators have emerged as the predominant methodological device for
evaluating discrimination claims”).
16 See Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-11977-DT, 2007 WL
907822, at *6–7 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007) (discussing this split among courts).

MC A LLIS TER (D O N O T D EL ET E)

762

1/9/2020 4:20 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:757

treatment of an opposite sex comparator is needed to prove that the
plaintiff’s sex played a factor in the employer’s decision, without which
there can be no actionable claim of “sex” discrimination. 17 Third, and
relatedly, this Article contends that same sex comparator evidence alone
cannot raise an inference of sex discrimination because such evidence,
while useful, does not show how the employer treats members of the
opposite sex, without which no inference of sex discrimination may arise. 18
Finally, this Article argues that same sex comparator evidence is
nevertheless relevant and plays an important role in proving sex -plus
discrimination—namely, to show that the employer does not engage in sex
discrimination across-the-board, but rather employs a more specific sexbased animus targeting only a particular subgroup of males or f emales. 19
For this reason, this Article contends that the strongest sex-plus claims are
those where the two types of comparator evidence are used in tandem.20
Take, for example, the facts of Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corporation, a United States Supreme Court case often cited as
establishing the sex-plus discrimination doctrine. 21 In that case, the Court
considered an employer’s policy of refusing to employ women, but not
men, with pre-school aged children. 22 In sex-plus terms, Phillips involves
an allegation that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff, a female
with children, on the basis of both her sex (female) and the plus
characteristic of having pre-school aged children. For such a claim, the
relevant opposite sex comparator is a male with pre-school aged children.
Evidence that an employer treats such an opposite sex comparator more
favorably than the plaintiff could be used, as Phillips declared, as proof that
the employer utilizes “one hiring policy for women and another for men,” 23
hence, that sex discrimination has occurred. 24 Because such opposite sex
17 See Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1446 (rejecting sex-plus claim for lack of opposite gender
comparator evidence, and stating that “[t]o establish that Vassar discriminated on the basis
of sex plus marital status, plaintiff must show that married men were treated differently from
married women”) (emphasis in original), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997).
18 See id. at 1446–47. See also Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d
1199, 1202–05 (10th Cir. 1997) (in sex-plus-marital status claim, ruling that a female
plaintiff must show that her male co-workers with the same marital status were treated
differently, and reversing jury verdict for the plaintiff due to a lack of evidence on that
point).
19 Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
20 See infra Part VI.
21 Phillips, 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
22 Id. at 544.
23 Id.
24 See id. (explaining that Title VII “requires that persons of like qualifications be given
employment opportunities irrespective of their sex,” a principle violated by the employer’s
use of one hiring policy for men and another for women). See also Smith v. AVSC Int’l,
Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 302, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that the “sex plus” theory

MC A LLIS TER (D O N O T D EL ET E)

2020]

PROVING SEX-PLUS DISCRIMINATION

1/9/2020 4:21 PM

763

comparator evidence directly exposes the employer’s differential treatment
of the sexes, albeit at the subgroup level, this is the most persuasive type of
comparator evidence a plaintiff can invoke in a sex-plus case. This is not
to suggest, however, that intra-group comparisons are not also relevant.
Recall that in a sex-plus case, the plaintiff does not allege that her employer
harbors discriminatory animus against women as a whole; rather, she
alleges a more specific sex-based animus targeting only a particular
segment of females. Such targeted animus can be exposed with evidence
that an employer treats women with children less favorably than it treats
either (a) men with children or (b) women without children, usually due to
the employer’s stereotypical belief that women with children, but not these
comparator subgroups, will be unreliable employees. 25 For this reason,
courts have found that a sex-plus plaintiff may establish a prima facie case
of discrimination in part based on evidence that she was rejected in favor of
a member of the same sex without the relevant plus characteristic.26
Before examining the role of comparator evidence in sex-plus cases,
Part II of this Article sets forth the general framework for analyzing pure
sex discrimination claims under Title VII. Part III then turns to sex -plus
discrimination claims, and provides examples where the doctrine has been
applied by courts. Part IV summarizes cases requiring sex -plus
discrimination claims to be proven with opposite sex comparator evidence.
Turning to same sex comparator evidence, Part V reviews cases either
rejecting the purported requirement of opposite sex comparator evidence or
permitting a sex-plus plaintiff to prove her claim through same sex
comparator evidence. Finally, Part VI argues that opposite sex comparator
evidence is indeed required to prove sex-plus discrimination through
comparator evidence, and that the strongest sex-plus claims are those where
both opposite sex and same sex comparator evidence are used in tandem.
In addition, Part VI argues that comparator evidence is just one means of
proving a sex-plus discrimination claim, and that a plaintiff who lacks
opposite sex comparator evidence may still prevail through other
evidentiary methods. Part VII concludes.

“recognizes that it is impermissible to treat men with an additional characteristic more or
less favorably than women with the same additional characteristic”).
25 See Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 2205(MBM), 1998 WL 912101, at *5–6
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff, a female
with children, could not prove sex discrimination because another woman, one without
children, received the promotion over the plaintiff).
26 See, e.g., McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323, 326–27 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(finding that a teacher could maintain a Title VII sex discrimination claim as a member of a
subclass of women with disabled children, and rejecting the defendant’s argument that her
claim must fail because the person selected for the position over the plaintiff was also a
woman, albeit one without a disabled child).
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II. GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING DISPARATE TREATMENT
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Employment discrimination statutes prohibit an employer from
discriminating against individuals on the basis of certain protected
characteristics, such as race or sex. 27 Determining exactly how a plaintiff
should go about proving employment discrimination has proven difficult
for courts and scholars, which have adopted or advanced a variety of
evidentiary approaches and frameworks. 28 Although this Article does not
attempt to resolve these various approaches and frameworks, it does
identify the relevant judicial constructs that may be applied to the sex-plus
discrimination scenario.
Regardless of the protected characteristic at issue, victims of
employment discrimination usually pursue one of f our types of claims:
disparate treatment, 29 disparate impact, 30 harassment,31 or retaliation.32 The
first type of claim, disparate treatment, is used to prove intentional acts of
discrimination, 33 where the use of comparator evidence is prevalent. 34
27

See supra note 2.
See Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV . 109,
159–68 (2007) (describing numerous circuit splits and various debates that have “plagued”
employment discrimination law); see also Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 852–
54 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing one circuit split regarding the nature of “direct” evidence),
aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); Ortiz v. Werner Enter., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016)
(attempting to clarify the proof requirements for Title VII claims).
29 See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 985–86 (1988).
30 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (authorizing disparate
impact claims under the ADEA); Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971)
(authorizing disparate impact claims under Title VII).
31 See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (authorizing
sexual harassment claims under Title VII); Rickard v. Swedish Match N. Am., Inc., 773
F.3d 181, 184–85 (8th Cir. 2014) (discussing workplace harassment claims based on either
sex or age).
32 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2018) (making it unlawful under Title VII “for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . .
because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter”); 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(d) (2018) (making it unlawful under the ADEA “for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because such individual . . .
has opposed any practice made unlawful by [the ADEA], or because such individual . . . has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or litigation under this chapter”).
33 Watson, 487 U.S. at 986–87; see also Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v.
Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1024 (11th Cir. 2016) (explaining that the
disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of discrimination “are not
interchangeable” and that “courts must be careful to distinguish between the[m]”); id.
(noting that “[t]o prevail on a disparate treatment claim, a Title VII plaintiff must
demonstrate that an employer intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of a
protected characteristic,” whereas “a disparate impact claim does not require proof of
28
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Disparate impact claims, by contrast, focus on the discriminatory effect of
an employer’s seemingly neutral practice, procedure, or test, and do not
require a plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent. 35 Although all four types
of claims are generally available across federal employment discrimination
statutes, this Article focuses on disparate treatment claims, which are most
commonly used to prove sex-plus discrimination.36
Whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail on a disparate treatment
discrimination claim depends somewhat on whether the case involves a
“single motive” or “mixed motive” claim. 37 For a mixed motive claim, a
plaintiff may prevail if she can demonstrate that the adverse employment
action she experienced was motivated by both permissible and forbidden
reasons—in other words, by proving that her gender was “a motivating
factor” in the employer’s decision, rather than “the sole motivating
factor.”38 In a mixed motive claim, however, the employer may present the
affirmative defense that it “would have taken the same action in the
absence of the impermissible motivating factor.”39 While this defense does
not completely absolve the employer of liability, it may limit the plaintiff’s
available remedies by precluding, among other things, money damages. 40
In a “single motive” claim, by contrast, a plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of evidence that the employer’s “true” motive was
discriminatory, which, unlike mixed motive claims, allows the plai ntiff to

discriminatory intent” and instead “targets an employment practice that has an actual,
though not necessarily deliberate, adverse impact on protected groups”).
34 See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 202–09 (discussing the use of comparator evidence in
disparate treatment cases).
35 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429–30.
36 See, e.g., Fuller v. GTE Corp./Contel Cellular, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 653, 656 (M.D.
Tenn. 1996) (describing the plaintiff’s Title VII claim as one alleging “disparate treatment
because of [plaintiff’s] gender and her status as a mother with young children”).
37 See Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[I]n a
‘mixed-motive’ case a plaintiff claims that an employment decision was based on both
legitimate and illegitimate reasons. Such cases are in contrast to so-called ‘pretext’ cases, in
which a plaintiff claims that an employer’s stated justification for an employment decision
is false.”).
38 Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284 (4th Cir. 2004).
This requirement derives from 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), which states that “an unlawful
employment practice [under Title VII] is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for
any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(m) (2018). See also Hill, 354 F.3d at 284.
39 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
40 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (clarifying that a successful affirmative defense
limits the available remedies to declaratory relief, injunctive relief, “and attorney’s fees and
costs”); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 348–49 (2013) (discussing the
distinction between the employer’s original defense pertaining to liability, and its current
defense pertaining to the plaintiff’s remedies).
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obtain money damages. 41 Unlike a mixed motive claim, then, the critical
issue in a single motive claim is whether a legal or illegal motive, but not
both, prompted the employer’s action. 42
Regardless of whether a plaintiff pursues a single or mixed motive
claim, the plaintiff may prove her employer’s discriminatory intent with
either direct or circumstantial evidence. 43
Direct evidence of
discriminatory intent has been defined as “evidence which, if believed . . .
does not require a factfinder to draw any inferences in order to conclude
that the challenged employment action was motivated at least in part by
prejudice against members of the protected group.” 44 Direct evidence
would include, for example, “a facially discriminatory employment policy
or a corporate decision maker’s express statement of a desire to remove
employees in the protected group.” 45
When there is no direct evidence of discriminatory intent in a single
motive claim, the type of claim most commonly asserted in a sex -plus
case,46 courts have traditionally employed the burden-shifting f ramework
of McDonnell Douglas v. Green47 to determine whether there is sufficient
circumstantial evidence to prove discriminatory intent. 48 Because direct
41

See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507–08 (1993).
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 260 (1989) (White, J., concurring)
(citations omitted) (explaining that in single-motive cases “the issue is whether either illegal
or legal motives, but not both, were the ‘true’ motives behind the decision,” whereas in
mixed-motive cases, “there is no one ‘true’ motive behind the decision,” which is
“[i]nstead . . . a result of multiple factors, at least one of which is legitimate”).
43 See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101–02 (2003) (interpreting Title VII
to allow plaintiffs to bring mixed-motive discrimination claims based solely on
circumstantial evidence).
44 Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 865 (6th Cir. 2003). See also Bodenheimer v.
PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 1993) (defining direct evidence as “evidence
which, if believed, would prove the existence of a fact (i.e., unlawful discrimination)
without any inferences or presumptions”).
45 Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2000).
46 See, e.g., Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1432 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that the
plaintiff’s sex-plus-marital status claim is not a mixed-motive case), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d
1332 (2d Cir. 1997).
47 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
48 See Williams v. Zurz, 503 F. App’x 367, 374–75 (6th Cir. 2012) (“In cases involving
circumstantial evidence, this Circuit has long applied the . . . McDonnell Douglas
framework.”); King v. Ferguson Enters., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1210 (N.D. Ga. 2013)
(stating that “[i]n the Eleventh Circuit, sex-discrimination claims based on circumstantial
evidence are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell
Douglas. . . .”), aff’d, 568 F. App’x 686 (11th Cir. 2014); Fuller v. GTE Corp./Contel
Cellular, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 653, 656 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (stating that “[t]he McDonnell
Douglas formula is inapplicable to cases in which the Title VII plaintiff presents credible,
direct evidence of discriminatory animus”); Jordan v. Radiology Imaging Assocs., 577 F.
Supp. 2d 771, 785 (D. Md. 2008) (noting that in the absence of direct evidence of
discrimination, the court would apply the McDonnell Douglas framework to analyze the
42
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evidence is hard to come by, the McDonnell Douglas test is often applied.49
The McDonnell Douglas test first requires a plaintiff to present
evidence of a prima facie case of discrimination. 50 The precise
requirements of the prima facie case vary 51 depending on the type of
adverse employment action at issue.52 In the hiring context, for example,
the plaintiff must show not only that he belongs to a protected class, but
also that he applied and was qualified for an available job; that he was
rejected, despite his qualifications; and that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons
of the complainant’s qualifications. 53
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, a
rebuttable presumption of unlawful discrimination arises. 54 The burden
then shifts to the employer to produce evidence of a “legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason” for its adverse employment action, which it
must do to avoid liability. 55 If the defendant carries its burden, the
presumption of unlawful discrimination is rebutted, and the burden then
shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s nondiscriminatory
explanation is pretextual and that the employer was more likely motivated

plaintiff’s sex-plus claim); Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-11977DT, 2007 WL 907822, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007) (applying the McDonnell Douglas
test after finding that a sex-plus plaintiff had failed to produce direct evidence of
discrimination). See also Katz, supra note 28, at 124–25 (explaining that the McDonnell
Douglas test provides another avenue, beyond direct evidence, for plaintiffs to prove that
the adverse employment action at issue occurred “because of” the plaintiff’s protected
characteristic, namely, by casting doubt on the employer’s explanation in an effort to prove
the employer’s explanation was a cover-up for discrimination).
49 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (stating that “the entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is
to compensate for the fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come
by”). See also Katz, supra note 28, at 120 (noting that the “McDonnell Douglas [test]
remains firmly entrenched in disparate treatment law”).
50 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
51 See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (noting that “the precise
requirements of the prima facie case can vary with the context and were ‘never intended to
be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic’”) (citation omitted).
52 See Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970–71 (11th Cir. 2008) (describing an
“adverse employment action” under Title VII as “a serious and material change in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment”); Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566,
575–76 (6th Cir. 2004) (defining an “adverse employment action” under Title VII as a
“materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of [plaintiff’s] employment,” and
finding that a
twenty-four-hour suspension, which was the equivalent of three eight-hour days, could
constitute an adverse employment action).
53 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
54 U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983).
55 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
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by discriminatory intent. 56 Thus, although the burden of production s hifts
back and forth, the burden of persuading the factfinder that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains “at all times with
the plaintiff.”57
By ultimately requiring the plaintiff to prove that discriminatory intent
is the more likely explanation for the employer’s action, as opposed to one
possible motivation, 58 the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis is
generally thought to be distinct from the motivating factor framework
employed in mixed motive cases, 59 and is typically more difficult for a
56 Id. at 804; St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507–08 (1993). See also
Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1433 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing that it is not enough
for a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s non-discriminatory explanation is pretextual;
rather, the plaintiff must also prove that discrimination was the true motive for the decision),
aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997); id. at 1448 (finding the plaintiff proved pretext,
but failed to prove that sex discrimination was the employer’s true motive); id. at 1437
(stating that “our ruling on pretext does not require as a corollary that we affirm the ultimate
finding on discrimination”). But see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 147–48 (2000) (clarifying that the evidence of discrimination put forth in the plaintiff’s
prima facie case, combined with the evidence that the employer’s asserted justification is
false, “may [be alone sufficient to] permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer
unlawfully discriminated”).
57 Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
58 See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506–07.
59 See Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining that the
plaintiff “presses her claim under two separate . . . theories,” the first a “mixed motives”
claim under Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), and the second “a traditional
discrimination claim under the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden shifting scheme”);
Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (“A Title VII plaintiff may
make a claim for discrimination ‘under either the pretext theory set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, . . . or the mixed-motive theory . . . under which a plaintiff may
show that an employment decision was made based on both legitimate and illegitimate
reasons.”) (citation omitted); Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277,
284–85 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that a plaintiff may “establish a claim for intentional sex . . .
discrimination through two avenues of proof,” first, under a mixed-motive theory, “by
demonstrating through direct or circumstantial evidence that sex . . . discrimination
motivated the employer’s adverse employment decision,” and second, “under a ‘pretext’
framework, . . . [by] demonstrate[ing] that the employer’s proffered permissible reason for
taking an adverse employment action is actually a pretext for discrimination”); Criner v.
Tex.-N.M. Power Co., 470 F. App’x 364, 369 (5th Cir. 2012) (stating that because the
plaintiff “did not adequately press a mixed-motive argument before the district court,” the
district court correctly applied the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis to her Title VII
discrimination claims); Hashem–Younes v. Danou Enters. Inc., 311 F. App’x 777, 779 (6th
Cir. 2009) (affirming district court’s application of the McDonnell Douglas framework
where the plaintiff failed to raise a mixed-motive claim in her complaint or in her response
to the defendant’s summary judgment motion); Bird v. W. Valley City, 832 F.3d 1188, 1200
n.6 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Plaintiff does not argue . . . that [her employer] had ‘mixed motives’
when firing her, and she thus does not contend that illegal gender discrimination played
[only] a ‘motivating part’ in the employment decision. For this reason, we utilize the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework alone in analyzing her attempt to prove
illegal gender discrimination.”) (internal marks and citations omitted); Fye v. Okla. Corp.
Comm’n, 516 F.3d 1217, 1225 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that courts do not employ the
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plaintiff to meet. 60 In addition, a court’s analysis under McDonnell
Douglas often boils down to whether the plaintiff has produced sufficient
evidence of pretext, an analysis that may hinge on comparator proof. 61
Although the pretext requirement can be stated in various ways, essentially
it requires the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s proffered legitimate
explanation is “unworthy of credence,”62 and was not the actual reason f or
its employment action, but instead a fabrication to conceal the employer’s
true, illegal motive. 63 Such a showing can be made when a plaintiff
demonstrates that the employer’s explanation should not be believed
“because it has no basis in fact,” or when the plaintiff simply persuades the
court that a prohibited reason more likely motivated the employer. 64 As
one court declared, “[t]he more idiosyncratic or questionable the
employer’s reason, the easier it will be to expose as a pretext, if indeed it is
one.”65
In sum, when a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence to prove
intentional discrimination for a single motive claim, the type of claim most
commonly asserted in a sex-plus case,66 the plaintiff must typically satisfy
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test to avoid dismissal of her
McDonnell Douglas framework in mixed-motives claims).
60 See Harrison v. Belk, Inc., 748 F. App’x 936, 941 n.1 (11th Cir. 2018) (describing
the McDonnell Douglas test as a “more burdensome standard” as compared to the “mixedmotives” standard).
61 See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 206 (noting that courts often look to comparator proof
at the pretext stage, where “the absence of a comparator is often fatal to the claim”); id. at
208 n.72 (citing cases illustrating that discrimination plaintiffs tend to lose when they fail to
generate relevant comparator proof). See, e.g., Sherman v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 188 F.3d
509 (6th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the plaintiff’s sex and sex-plus-age discrimination claims
based on her inability to prove pretext); cf. Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1434–48 (rejecting the
plaintiff’s sex-plus-marital status claim based on insufficient evidence to prove that
plaintiff’s tenure denial was ultimately the result of discrimination, even though the plaintiff
had proven pretext), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997).
62 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
63 Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009). See also Millbrook v.
IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 2002) (defining pretext as “a lie, specifically a
phony reason for some action”); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (stating that at the pretext stage,
the plaintiff “now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was
not the true reason for the employment decision,” a burden that “now merges with the
ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional
discrimination”).
64 Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1047 (8th Cir. 2011) (“There are at
least two ways a plaintiff may demonstrate a material question of fact regarding pretext. A
plaintiff may show that the employer’s explanation is ‘unworthy of credence . . . because it
has no basis in fact.’ Alternatively, a plaintiff may show pretext ‘by persuading the court
that a [prohibited] reason more likely motivated the employer.’”).
65 Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1012 n.6 (1st Cir. 1979).
66 See, e.g., Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1432 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that the
plaintiff’s sex-plus-marital status claim is not a mixed-motive case), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d
1332 (2d Cir. 1997).
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claim.67 A court’s analysis under McDonnell Douglas often boils down to
whether the plaintiff can show that her employer’s stated legitimate reason
for its employment action was pretextual and that the employer was more
likely motivated by discriminatory intent, which will often hinge on
comparator evidence. 68 If a plaintiff survives the McDonnell Douglas
analysis and avoids summary judgment, the employer’s true motivation
would then become the primary issue at trial. 69 With these general
principles in mind, this Article now considers the specific sex-plus
discrimination scenario.
III. SEX-PLUS DISCRIMINATION
Under the sex-plus discrimination doctrine, a plaintiff, often f emale,
may bring a Title VII claim for sex discrimination if she can show that her
employer discriminated against her not because of her sex per se, but
because of the combination of her sex plus some additional factor, such as
having young children. 70 As courts have developed the doctrine, the “plus”
factor in a sex-plus case must pertain either to an immutable characteristic
or the exercise of a fundamental right. 71 This section examines these two
67

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Compare Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-11977-DT, 2007
WL 907822, at *6–9 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007) (applying the McDonnell Douglas test and
granting summary judgment to the defendant on sex-plus claim due to a lack of evidence
that the plaintiff was treated differently than males with young children), with Stalter v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 195 F.3d 285, 289–90 (7th Cir. 1999) (in a race discrimination claim,
finding the plaintiff’s evidence of pretext “more than sufficient evidence to impugn the
genuineness of Wal-Mart’s motives,” in part due to evidence that the plaintiff’s employer
provided more lenient treatment to a similarly situated Caucasian employee who committed
a similar act).
69 See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 855 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that
the McDonnell Douglas “legal proof structure is a tool to assist plaintiffs at the summary
judgment stage so that they may reach trial”), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); Tex. Dep’t of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (noting that the plaintiff bears “[t]he
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff”). See also Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th
Cir. 1999) (declaring that “it is unnecessary and inappropriate to instruct the jury on the
McDonnell Douglas analysis”); Costa, 299 F.3d at 855 (same); Palmer v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. Sys. of Ga., 208 F.3d 969, 974 (11th Cir. 2000) (declaring that although phrases such
as “prima facie case” or “burden of production” should not be explained to a jury, the
plaintiff still “bears the ultimate burden of proving that discriminatory animus was a
determinative factor in the adverse employment decision”).
70 See Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 54 (1st Cir. 2018) (recognizing
that in sex-plus claims, “the simple question posed . . . is whether the employer took an
adverse employment action at least in part because of an employee’s sex,” and applying the
sex-plus theory to plaintiffs who were allegedly discriminated against at least in part
because of their gender where the “plus-factor” is sexual orientation) (alteration in original).
71 Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1033 (5th Cir. 1980).
The sex-plus theory of discrimination does not apply when the “plus” factor at issue does
not involve an immutable characteristic, such as race or national origin, or a constitutionally
68
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types of sex-plus discrimination claims.
A. Sex Plus Discrimination Claims Involving a Fundamental Right
The United States Supreme Court first ratified the notion that Title
VII could be violated by an employer’s discriminatory treatment of a
subclass of women in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation.72 In
Phillips, the Court declared that sex discrimination may occur through an
employer’s policy of refusing to employ women, but not men, with pre school aged children. 73
Just as importantly, Phillips established that when an employer
discriminates against a particular subgroup of women, such as women with
children, the employer may not defend its actions with evidence that it does
not discriminate against women on the whole.74 The Court thus deemed it
irrelevant that at least seventy-five percent of the persons hired for the
position at issue were women, albeit those without children, given that
discrimination had occurred against a specific subgroup of women—i.e.,
those with young children.75 As such, although the Phillips defendant had
attempted to show that no sex discrimination had occurred with what this
Article refers to as “same sex comparator evidence,” this evidence actually
had the opposite effect. Rather than disproving the plaintiff’s claim, this
evidence in fact highlighted the employer’s unique stereotypical biases
against the particular subgroup of women to which the plaintiff belonged,
thereby demonstrating its relevance.
In another case involving a sex-plus discrimination claim with a
“plus” characteristic involving a fundamental right, M cGrenaghan v. St.
Denis School, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania ruled that a teacher could maintain a Title VII sex
discrimination claim as a member of a subclass of women with disabled
children.76 There, the court found evidence of discriminatory animus
against mothers with disabled children, including direct evidence of
discriminatory animus by the school’s principal. 77 Similar to Phillips, the

protected fundamental right, such as marriage or child rearing. See id. at 1033–34. For
example, courts have rejected sex-plus discrimination claims in the context of gender
differentiated appearance requirements, such as employer policies imposing different
makeup or hair length requirements for men and women. See Marc Chase McAllister,
Extending the Sex Plus Discrimination Doctrine to Age Discrimination Claims, 60 B.C. L.
REV . 469, 485–87 (2019) (discussing the limits of sex-plus theory).
72 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
73 Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544.
74 See id. at 543–44.
75 Id.
76 McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
77 Id. at 327.
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court thus rejected the defendant’s argument that it could not be liable f or
sex discrimination on the basis that the person hired for the position was
also a woman, reasoning that the person hired was “not a member of the
subclass of women with disabled children” to which the plaintiff
belonged.78
Phillips and McGrenaghan are examples of sex-plus discrimination
claims brought by female employees treated differently than their male
counterparts for having children. 79 Courts have recognized similar
subclasses of women based on their exercise of other fundamental rights. 80
Courts have found, for example, that an employer’s unfavorable treatment
of married women, as compared to married men, violates Title VII. 81
In the sex-plus-marital status cases, as in Phillips and McGrenaghan ,
courts have rejected employer arguments that no sex discrimination had
occurred because the employer did not discriminate against women as a
whole.82 In one such case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit noted that an employer’s no-marriage rule, which it applied
to female flight attendants but not their male counterparts, violated Title
VII even though the rule did not apply to all f emale employees, “for so
long as sex is a factor in the application of the rule, such application
involves a discrimination based on sex.” 83 Thus, the Seventh Circuit
declared, Title VII’s effect “is not to be diluted because discrimination
adversely affects only a portion of the protected class.”84 As another court
78 Id.
Accordingly, the court denied summary judgment to the defendant on the
plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim. Id.
79 See also Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 48 (1st Cir. 2009) (denying
summary judgment to the defendant-employer on similar sex plus discrimination claim);
Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-11977-DT, 2007 WL 907822, at *6–
9 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007) (recognizing a similar claim, but granting summary judgment
to the defendant on the plaintiff’s “sex plus” claim due to a lack of evidence that the
plaintiff was treated differently than males with young children).
80 Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1033 (5th Cir. 1980).
81 See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (finding
employer’s no-marriage rule for stewardesses to violate Title VII); Jurinko v. Wiegand Co.,
331 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (finding that employer’s refusal to hire married
women violated Title VII). See also Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d
1199, 1202–05 (10th Cir. 1997) (in sex-plus-marital status claim, ruling that a female
plaintiff must show that her male co-workers with the same marital status were treated
differently, and reversing jury verdict for the plaintiff due to a lack of evidence on that
point); Gee-Thomas v. Cingular Wireless, 324 F. Supp. 2d 875, 884, 888 (M.D. Tenn. 2004)
(recognizing a sex plus claim on the basis of sex plus marital and family status, but
ultimately dismissing the plaintiff’s claim because she failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact for trial on the issue of pretext).
82 See Jurinko, 331 F. Supp. at 1187 (rejecting the argument).
83 See Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198 (adopting the reasoning of the EEOC, as expressed in
29 CFR § 1604.3(a)).
84 Id.
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in a similar case declared, “[i]f [a] company discriminates against married
women, but not against married men, the variable[s] become[] [men and]
women, and the discrimination, based on solely sexual distinctions,
invidious and unlawful.”85
B. Sex-Plus Discrimination Claims Involving Immutable
Characteristics
As noted, the sex-plus theory applies when an employer discriminates
against a particular subclass of males or females based on the exercise of a
fundamental right, such as the right to marry or have children; 86 or an
immutable characteristic, such as race. 87 Immutable characteristics are
simply those the employee cannot change. 88
In the past fifty years, courts have recognized various p lusdiscrimination claims involving a combination of immutable
characteristics, including claims of discrimination based on sex -plus-race
(e.g., alleging discrimination against black females 89 or against Asian
females),90 race-plus-religion (e.g., alleging discrimination against a white
Jewish male), 91 and sex-plus-age (e.g., involving discrimination against
older women). 92
In a leading sex-plus-race case, Jefferies v. Harris County Community
Action Association,93 plaintiff Dafro Jefferies, a black female, alleged that
her employer discriminated against her due to her race and sex. 94 The
district court separated Jefferies’ single sex-plus-race claim into distinct

85

Jurinko, 331 F. Supp. at 1187.
See supra Part II.A.
87 See Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Nicole Buonocore
Porter, Sex Plus Age Discrimination: Protecting Older Women Workers, 81 D ENV . U. L.
REV . 79, 87 (2003).
88 David Schraub, Unsuspecting, 96 B.U. L. REV . 361, 378 (2016) (citing Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)).
89 See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1034 (5th Cir.
1980) (recognizing a subclass of black women or a sex-plus-race claim).
90 See, e.g., Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1561–62 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing
a subclass of Asian women or a sex-plus-race claim).
91 See, e.g., Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 153 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding sufficient
evidence “to support an inference that [Feingold] was terminated on the basis of his religion
and/or race”).
92 See, e.g., Cartee v. Wilbur Smith Assocs., Inc., C/A No. 3:08-4132-JFA-PJG, 2010
WL 1052082, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2010).
93 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
94 Id. at 1028. “In her complaint, Jefferies charged that HCCAA discriminated against
her in promotion ‘because she is a woman, up in age and because she is Black.’” Id. at
1029. Jefferies’ age-based discrimination claim, however, did not materialize at trial, and
was not before the court on appeal. Id. at 1030.
86
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claims of race discrimination and sex discrimination. 95 This, in turn,
allowed the district court to reject Jefferies’ race discrimination claim
based on evidence that the promotion she sought was instead f illed by a
black male, in other words, with opposite sex comparator evidence. 96 The
district court then rejected Jefferies’ sex discrimination claim du e to
evidence that sixty to seventy percent of the defendant’s employees were
female, who often held important positions within the organization. 97
Overturning the district court’s decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals found it improper to separate Jefferies’ single sex-plus-race
discrimination claim into separate claims of race and sex discrimination. 98
This was error, according to the court, because “discrimination against
black females can exist even in the absence of discrimination against black
men or white women.”99 Echoing Phillips, the court thus concluded that
the employer’s relatively favorable treatment of black males and white
females may not be used to disprove the plaintiff’s allegations of sex -plus
discrimination, as black men and white women fall outside the relevant
subclass of black females.100 This analysis, in turn, suggests that opposite
sex comparator evidence (here, focused on the employer’s treatment of
black males) and same sex comparator evidence (here, focused on the
employer’s treatment of white females), can be used by a plaintiff as
evidence of the employer’s targeted sex-based animus, rather than the other
way around.101
95

See id. at 1032.
Id. at 1030 (rejecting Jefferies’ claim of pure race discrimination in promotion, given
that the person promoted to the position at issue was also black).
97 Id. at 1029.
98 Id. at 1032.
99 Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1032.
100 See id. at 1034.
See also Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN . L. REV .
1241, 1243–44 (1991) (“[T]he experiences of women of color are frequently the product of
intersecting patterns of racism and sexism, and . . . tend not to be represented within the
discourses of either feminism or antiracism.”).
101 Jefferies is one example of a sex-plus claim combining multiple immutable
characteristics. A variety of courts have ratified sex-plus claims by subclasses of employees
in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416–17
(10th Cir. 1987) (adopting the reasoning of Jefferies in recognizing a sex-plus-race hostile
work environment claim); Robertson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:14-CV-01861
(VLB), 2017 WL 326317, at *8 (D. Conn. Jan. 23, 2017) (recognizing that “[a] plaintiff
may bring a [discrimination] claim under a combination of two protected grounds of Title
VII, such as race and gender”); Walton v. Vilsack, No. 09-7627, 2011 WL 3489967, at *10
(E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2011) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that a plaintiff cannot present
evidence of discrimination against her as an African-American female); Johnson v. Dillard’s
Inc., No. 3:03–3445–MBS, 2007 WL 2792232, at *3–5 (D.S.C. Sept. 24, 2007) (in a lengthy
discussion of the issue, recognizing a combination claim alleging race-plus-sex
discrimination under Title VII); Nieto v. Kapoor, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1140 (D.N.M.
96
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IV. COMPARATOR EVIDENCE IN SEX-PLUS CASES: REQUIREMENT OF A
COMPARATOR OUTSIDE PLAINTIFF’S PROTECTED CLASS WHO SHARES THE
SAME “PLUS” CHARACTERISTIC
The remainder of this Article focuses on the evidentiary requirements
for proving sex-plus discrimination. This section begins with opposite sex
comparator evidence, defined as evidence pertaining to a person of the
opposite sex as the plaintiff who shares the same plus characteristic. As
explained below, numerous courts have held, or impliedly expressed the
view, that Title VII sex-plus discrimination claims necessarily f ail in the
absence of opposite sex comparator evidence. Courts expressing this
approach include the United States Courts of Appeal for the Second, Third,
and Tenth Circuits, 102 along with various federal district courts. 103
2000) (considering evidence of harassment based on both race and their sex); Chambers v.
Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925, 944 (D. Neb. 1986) (treating the plaintiff’s race and
gender discrimination claims as involving “the class of black women”), aff’d sub nom.
Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987); Graham v. Bendix
Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (“Under Title VII, the plaintiff as a black
woman is protected against discrimination on the double grounds of race and sex, and an
employer who singles out black females for less favorable treatment does not defeat
plaintiff’s case by showing that white females or black males are not so unfavorably
treated.”).
102 See Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1202–05 (10th
Cir. 1997) (ruling that in a sex-plus-marital status claim a female plaintiff must show that
her male co-workers with the same marital status were treated differently, and reversing jury
verdict for the plaintiff due to a lack of evidence on that point); Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70
F.3d 1420, 1446–47 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejecting sex-plus-marital status claim brought by
female plaintiff in regards to her tenure denial because she “failed to present any evidence to
show that married males who were up for tenure received ‘better, or even different
treatment’”) (emphasis in original), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997); Bryant v.
Int’l Sch. Servs., Inc., 675 F.2d 562, 575 (3d Cir. 1982) (in rejecting a sex-plus-marital
status claim, stating that “[t]o prove their prima facie case appellants’ must produce
evidence that similarly situated males were treated differently and that there was no
adequate nonsexual explanation for the different treatment”).
103 See Llana-Aday v. Dist. Bd. of Trustees of Miami-Dade Coll., No. 11–22825–CIV.,
2012 WL 5833612, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2012) (granting summary judgment to the
defendant on female plaintiff’s sex-plus claim based on having children because the plaintiff
failed to present evidence regarding an opposite sex comparator with the same child-rearing
responsibilities); Cote v. Shinseki, No. 807-cv-1524-T-TBM., 2009 WL 1537901, at *14
n.30 (M.D. Fla. June 2, 2009) (rejecting sex-plus claim and declaring that “gender-plus
plaintiffs can never be successful if there is no corresponding subclass of members of the
opposite gender [because] [s]uch plaintiffs cannot make the requisite showing that they were
treated differently from similarly situated members of the opposite gender”) (emphasis in
original) (quoting Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th
Cir. 1997)); Jordan v. Radiology Imaging Assocs., 577 F. Supp. 2d 771, 785 (D. Md. 2008)
(finding the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of sex-plus discrimination
because she did not produce “evidence that women with children were treated differently
from men with children”); Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-11977DT., 2007 WL 907822, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007) (establishing that a same sex
comparator evidence alone cannot prove discrimination on the basis of sex); Miller v. Grand
Holdings, Inc., No. Civ.04–2688 ADM/AJB, 2005 WL 1745639, at *8 (D. Minn. July 26,
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In one leading case, Coleman v. B-G Maintenance M anagement of
Colorado, Inc., the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals declared that “genderplus plaintiffs can never be successful if there is no corresponding subclass
of members of the opposite gender,” and consequently no evidence of how
such opposite sex comparators were treated. 104 Without such comparator
evidence, the court declared, sex-plus “plaintiffs cannot make the requisite
showing that they were treated differently from similarly situated members
of the opposite gender,” a key component of any “sex” discrimination
claim.105
2005) (rejecting sex-plus-marital status claim brought by a female plaintiff because the
plaintiff presented no evidence that “similarly situated men with children were treated more
favorably.”); Witt v. Cty. Ins. & Fin. Servs., No. 04 C 3938, 2004 WL 2644397, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 18, 2004) (dismissing a female plaintiff’s sex-plus-marital status claim because she
failed to present evidence of similarly-situated males who were treated differently by her
employer); Hess-Watson v. Potter, No. Cic.A. 703CV00389, 2004 WL 34833, at *2 (W.D.
Va. Jan. 4, 2004) (rejecting a female plaintiff’s claim alleging sex-plus discrimination due to
having small children because she presented no evidence that males with small children
were treated differently than women with small children; “[r]ather, she claims that the
[employer favored] women without small children, but in the absence of a male comparator,
this simply does not establish a viable ‘sex plus’ discrimination claim”); Longariello v. Sch.
Bd. of Monroe Cty., Fla., 987 F. Supp. 1440, 1449 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (granting summary
judgment to the defendant on a male plaintiff’s sex-plus-marital status claim, based on the
fact that he was single, because he failed to provide any evidence of how his employer
treated single women), aff’d sub nom. Longariello v. Sch. Bd., 161 F.3d 21 (11th Cir. 1998);
Bass v. Chem. Banking Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8833 (SHS), 1996 WL 374151, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
July 2, 1996) (rejecting a female plaintiff’s sex-plus-parental status or sex-plus-marital
status claim based on a failure to promote because the plaintiff produced no evidence that
her former employer “treated her differently than married men or men with children with
regard to promotion” adding that promotion of a single woman with no children shows at
most “discriminat[ion] against married persons or persons with children”). Cf. King v.
Ferguson Enters., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1214 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (stating that “when
female plaintiffs alleging gender-plus discrimination point to a comparator to prove their
prima facie case, they must show that the comparator is both male and has the relevant plus
characteristic,” but recognizing that such comparator proof is not the only means of
establishing a prima facie case) (emphasis in original), aff’d, 568 F. App’x 686 (11th Cir.
2014); DeAngelo v. DentalEZ, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 572, 585 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (stating that
when a plaintiff alleges sex-plus-age discrimination against older women, the plaintiff “must
present evidence that older men, the relevant comparator, were treated more favorably” such
that “evidence regarding [the employer’s] alleged preference for hiring younger women is
not on point for this claim” which instead pertains to an age discrimination claim); id.
(noting further that despite a lack of opposite gender comparator evidence, a plaintiff “may
still proceed on a sex-plus theory if she has direct record evidence of gender
discrimination.”); Nesselrotte v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., No. 06–01390, 2009 WL 703395,
at *11 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2009) (in a sex-plus-dependent children claim, requiring a female
plaintiff to present evidence regarding the corresponding subclass of men, and rejecting the
plaintiff’s attempt to raise an inference of sex discrimination with evidence that she was
replaced by a woman without children); id. (noting that the plaintiff could rely on evidence,
apart from a relevant male comparator, “of any other circumstances, such as impermissible
stereotyping, that raise an inference of gender discrimination under Title VII”).
104 108 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 1997).
105 Id.
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Coleman involved a female plaintiff, Stephanie Coleman, who was
fired after one of the employees she supervised, her common-law husband,
repeatedly left work during his shift.106 Thereafter, Coleman brought Title
VII claims against her former employer for discrimination on the basis of
sex and sex-plus-marital status. 107 At trial, Coleman argued that the
defendant had not terminated male supervisors whose subordinate
employees had left work during their shifts. 108 She did not, however,
present evidence that any of those male supervisors were married (or
otherwise shared the same plus factor). 109 Nevertheless, the jury rejected
Coleman’s pure sex discrimination claim while ruling in her favor on her
sex-plus-marital status claim, which the defendant appealed.110
On appeal, the defendant argued that the jury’s verdict must be
reversed because the district court’s jury instructions allowed the jury to
rule for Coleman on her sex-plus claim without proof that she was treated
differently than males with a similar marital status.111 The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals agreed. 112 As the Tenth Circuit declared, “Title VII
prohibits employers from treating married women differently than married
men, but it does not protect marital status alone.” 113 Nevertheless, as to her
sex-plus claim, the district court’s instructions failed to require proof that
similarly situated males were treated differently, and thus allowed the jury
to return a verdict for Coleman if marital status alone were the reason f or
her termination. 114 For this reason, the jury’s verdict had to be reversed.115
Going one step further, the court then addressed the defendant’s
argument that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Coleman’s
sex-plus claim due to a complete lack of evidence to support that claim. 116
Agreeing with the defendant, the court reiterated that the evidence merely
showed that the defendant had not terminated male supervisors whose
subordinate employees had left work during their shifts, but there was no
evidence that any of those male supervisors “had any kind of personal

106

Coleman, 108 F.3d at 1202.
Id. at 1201. The court referred to these two claims as discrimination on the basis of
“gender” and “gender plus her marital status.” For simplicity, this Article refers to those
claims as “sex” and “sex-plus-marital status.”
108 Id. at 1202.
109 Id. at 1205.
110 Id. at 1202.
111 Id. at 1202–03. The jury instruction at issue is quoted in footnote 1 of the court’s
opinion. See id. at 1202 n.1.
112 Coleman, 108 F.3d at 1203.
113 Id. at 1204.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 1205.
107
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relationship, marital or otherwise, with their subordinate employees.”117 At
most, then, Coleman’s evidence tended to prove pure sex discrimination, a
claim the jury rejected, leaving Coleman with no viable discrimination
claim.118
Coleman effectively requires a sex-plus claim to be supported by
opposite sex comparator evidence. 119 Indeed, in one passage––often quoted
by subsequent cases—the court declared that “gender-plus plaintiffs can
never be successful if there is no corresponding subclass of members of the
opposite gender” because, in that event, “[s]uch plaintiffs cannot make the
requisite showing that they were treated differently from similarly situated
members of the opposite gender.” 120 Just as importantly, the Coleman
court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that “[sex]-plus plaintiffs can
compare themselves to all persons outside the corresponding subclass” to
which the plaintiff belongs,121 thereby suggesting that same sex comparator
evidence is insufficient to prove the requisite discriminatory treatment
between the sexes. 122 This point was more explicitly stated in a Second
Circuit Court of Appeals case, Fisher v. Vassar College.123
In Fisher, plaintiff and biology professor, Cynthia Fisher, filed a sexplus-marital status discrimination suit against her former employer, Vassar
College, after it denied her tenure. 124 The evidence at trial focused on two
issues: Fisher’s qualifications for tenure, and evidence of Vassar’s history
of tenure decisions involving married women.125 As to the latter dispute,
Fisher presented, among other evidence, 126 statistical evidence purporting
to show that no married female professor in the “hard” sciences had been
granted tenure in the three decades before Fisher was denied tenure, 127
117

Id.
Coleman, 108 F.3d at 1205. For these reasons, the court reversed the jury’s award of
$250,000 damages to Coleman. Id.
119 See id. at 1203 (stating that for a sex-plus claim, “the plaintiff must . . . prove that the
subclass of women was unfavorably treated as compared to the corresponding subclass of
men”). See also id. at 1204.
120 Id. at 1204. See also Longariello v. Sch. Bd. of Monroe Cty. Fla., 987 F. Supp.
1440, 1449 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (quoting Coleman for the proposition that “[g]ender-plus
plaintiffs can never be successful if there is no corresponding subclass of members of the
opposite gender”), aff’d sub nom. Longariello v. Sch. Bd., 161 F.3d 21 (11th Cir. 1998).
121 See Coleman, 108 F.3d at 1204 (rejecting this argument).
122 See id.
123 70 F.3d 1420, 1446 (2d Cir. 1995), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997).
124 Id. at 1426.
125 Id.
126 See id. at 1438 (explaining that Fisher’s evidence consisted not only of statistical
evidence, but also anecdotes, perceived admissions by the decisionmakers in Fisher’s case,
and expert testimony); id. at 1442 (noting that Fisher’s evidence “lean[ed] heavily on
statistics”).
127 See id. at 1427 (finding the “hard” sciences to include mathematics, physics,
118
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whereas the majority of single women in the hard sciences had been
granted tenure during the same time period.128 In defense, Vassar pointed
to the plaintiff’s lack of comparator evidence regarding how married males
were treated, and presented its own data regarding its school-wide record of
promoting women. 129
After a bench trial, the district court ruled in Fisher’s favor, directed
Vassar to pay damages exceeding $600,000, and issued an order reinstating
Fisher to her former position with a fresh opportunity to apply for tenure.130
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding clear error in the
district court’s reliance on the plaintiff’s same sex statistics. 131
Specifically, the court declared, Fisher “failed to present a n y evidence to
show that married males who were up for tenure received better, or even
different treatment.” 132 This lack of opposite sex comparator evidence
proved fatal to Fisher’s claim, because “[i]f Vassar was as unlikely to
promote married men as it was to promote married women, then the only

chemistry, geology, biology, and computer science, but not psychology); see also id. at
1442–43 (describing the plaintiff’s statistical evidence in detail).
128 The plaintiff’s data included “59 female professors who were employed by Vassar at
or above the rank of visiting assistant professor for two years or more in the departments of
biology, chemistry, mathematics, physics, geology[,] and psychology at some point”
between the years 1956 and 1985. Id. at 1442. “Of the 59 people, 19 already had tenure in
1956.” Id. The plaintiff’s data separated the remaining forty individuals into categories
based on whether they were single or non-single, and further indicated whether each
individual was either “Promoted” (i.e., granted tenure) or “Terminated or left” (including
professors who were either denied tenure or left Vassar for any reason). Id. Of those fourty
individuals, fifteen were categorized as non-single; only one of those fifteen non-single
persons (a psychology professor who the district court excluded from the hard sciences) was
granted tenure. Id. at 1443; see also id. at 1444 (concluding that the district court should
have included psychology in the hard sciences). The plaintiff’s data further showed that of
the twenty-five single individuals, fourteen had been granted tenure. Id. See also Fisher v.
Vassar Coll., 852 F. Supp. 1193, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (setting forth the district court’s
findings on the tenure decisions for married and unmarried women in the hard sciences).
129 Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1426–27. Fisher also presented evidence that the hard sciences
had traditionally been composed of single women, as well as married and single men. Id. at
1427; Fisher, 852 F. Supp. at 1225–26. Yet, Fisher’s statistics regarding tenure awards,
which she “lean[ed] heavily on” in her attempt to establish that Vassar discriminated against
married women, Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1442, focused on Vassar’s relative treatment of married
and unmarried women. Id. at 1443. Thus, on appeal, the Second Circuit considered
whether the district court clearly erred in finding sex-plus discrimination largely on the basis
of Fisher’s same sex comparator statistics, which did not include evidence regarding the
success of married males who were up for tenure. See id. at 1443 (quoting district court’s
findings based on Fisher’s statistics); id. at 1446. See also id. at 1434 (explaining that the
court would overturn the district court’s findings of fact only if clearly erroneous).
130 Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1426, 1431.
131 Id. at 1443.
132 Id. at 1447 (quoting Bryant v. Int’l Sch. Servs., Inc., 675 F.2d 562, 575 (3d Cir.
1982)).
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thing one could say is that Vassar discriminated against married people,”133
which is not unlawful under Title VII. 134
When a sex-plus plaintiff attempts to prove her case through
comparator evidence, Fisher effectively requires opposite sex comparator
evidence to prove the requisite sex discrimination.135 In the words of the
Second Circuit, “[t]o establish that Vassar discriminated on the basis of sex
plus marital status, [a] plaintiff [like Fisher] must show that married men
were treated differently from married women.”136 “Absent this sex-to-sex
comparison,” the court declared, “plaintiff’s [same sex comparator]
statistics are meaningless.” 137
Like Fisher, various federal district courts have also rejected sex-plus
claims unsupported by opposite sex comparator evidence. In one case, Fox
v. Brown Memorial Home, Inc.,138 the plaintiff alleged that she was fired
from her job due to her marriage to a man who also worked for the
employer, such that her firing was based upon her sex -plus-marital
status.139 In reviewing her claim, the United States District Court f or the
Southern District of Ohio—quoting from a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
case—declared that in a sex-plus case, “a female plaintiff must . . . prove
that the subclass of women was unfavorably treated as compared to the
corresponding subclass of men,”140 adding that “[a]bsent such a
corresponding subclass of men, a plaintiff cannot establish sex
discrimination.”141 In Fox, the plaintiff failed to allege that a subclass of
women was treated unfavorably compared to a subclass of men. 142 For this
reason, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s sex-plus claim.143
133

Id.
Id. See also King v. Ferguson Enters., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1215 (N.D. Ga.
2013) (noting that “if a woman [claiming sex-plus discrimination] cannot show that her
employer treats the same subclass of men differently, then gender is not a factor; moreover,
allowing her claim without such evidence would result in the protection of the characteristic
rather than gender”), aff’d, 568 F. App’x 686 (11th Cir. 2014).
135 See Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1446–47. But see id. at 1447 n.12 (recognizing that when “the
complainant establishes by evidence that there are no [similarly situated] males [with the
same plus factor at issue] and that it is unlikely that there would be any, then it may be that
the complainant would be able to prevail by providing some other evidence of
discrimination”).
136 Id. at 1446 (emphasis in original).
137 Id.
138 No. 2:09-cv-915, 2010 WL 3167849 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 2010).
139 See id. at *1–2.
140 Id. at *2 (quoting Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 374 F.3d 428, 432 (6th Cir.
2004)) (internal marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
141 Id. at *2 (quoting Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 374 F.3d 428, 432 (6th Cir.
2004)) (internal marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
142 Id. at *3.
143 See id. (stating that “[b]ecause the Complaint does not allege the existence of a
134
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In another similar case, Fuller v. GTE Corp./Contel Cellular, Inc. ,144
the plaintiff alleged that her former employer violated Title VII by
discriminating against her because of her sex combined with her status as a
mother of young children.145 Similar to Fox, the Fuller court rejected the
plaintiff’s sex-plus claim because the plaintiff “failed to show”—and did
not even allege in her complaint—“that she was treated differently” than
men with young children. 146 For sex-plus claims of the type alleged in
Fuller, the court declared that a plaintiff must present “evidence to show
that fathers of young children received better or even different
treatment.” 147 Here, however, the plaintiff offered no evidence that her
employer “would have treated her any differently had she been a father and
everything else had remained the same.” 148 Without the requisite opposite
sex comparator evidence, the court rejected the plaintiff’s sex-plus claim.149
V. COMPARATOR EVIDENCE IN SEX-PLUS CASES: COURTS THAT
RECOGNIZE THE RELEVANCE OF SAME SEX COMPARATOR EVIDENCE IN
PROVING SEX-PLUS DISCRIMINATION
In contrast to the cases described in the previous section, which
generally require opposite sex comparator evidence to prove sex -plus
discrimination claims while finding little to no evidentiary value in same
sex comparator evidence, other cases have relied heavily on same sex
comparator evidence, at times validating sex-plus claims even without
opposite sex comparator proof. 150 Cases in this line include two opinions
from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

similarly situated male subclass, [the plaintiff] cannot demonstrate that she was a victim of
sex discrimination under Title VII”).
144 926 F. Supp. 653 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
145 Id. at 656.
146 Id. at 657.
147 Id. at 658.
148 Id. at 657 (emphasis in original). The court also found it significant that the plaintiff
was replaced by another female with children, id., which seems particularly important in
light of the court’s iteration of the final requirement of the plaintiff’s prima facie case—
namely, that the plaintiff “was replaced by someone outside of the protected class,” id. at
656.
149 Id. at 657.
150 To be clear, rather than rejecting same sex comparator evidence outright, courts in
cases like Fisher and Philipsen often simply declare that in the absence of opposite gender
comparator evidence, same sex comparator evidence alone cannot prove discrimination on
the basis of sex. See Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-11977-DT,
2007 WL 907822, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007) (establishing that same sex comparator
evidence alone cannot prove discrimination on the basis of sex); Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70
F.3d 1420, 1446 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing the plaintiff’s statistics comparing the
employer’s treatment of married versus unmarried women as “meaningless” absent a
statistically sound “sex-to-sex comparison”), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997).
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Pennsylvania, Arnett v. Aspin,151 and McGrenaghan v. St. Denis School; 152
another District Court opinion from New York, Trezza v. Hartford, Inc. ; 153
and Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free School Dist.,154 a Second
Circuit Court of Appeals case.
In Arnett v. Aspin, Judge Lowell E. Reed, Jr., of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, recognized a sex plus-age discrimination claim under Title VII based upon discrimination
against the subgroup of women over the age of forty.155 There, forty-nineyear old plaintiff, Mary Arnett, alleged that she was discriminated against
by her employer because she was a female over the age of f orty. 156 To
support her claim, Arnett presented evidence that two women younger than
thirty were hired over her for the position of equal employment
specialist.157 She also claimed, and the defendants admitted, that all of the
defendants’ equal employment specialists had been either women under
forty or men over forty. 158
Arguing primarily that Title VII does not authorize sex-plus-age
claims, the defendants moved for summary judgment, which Judge Reed
denied.159 Although Judge Reed’s opinion focuses on explaining why sexplus-age claims are valid under Title VII, 160 an issue that remains
unsettled,161 Judge Reed’s analysis of the merits of Arnett’s claim explicitly
invokes both opposite sex and same sex comparator evidence. Regarding
opposite sex comparator evidence, Judge Reed found that “the defendants
discriminated against [Arnett] on the basis of her sex . . . [by] requir[ing]
more of her than they did of the male applicants for the position of equal
employment specialist. That is, they required that she be under the age of
forty.”162 Highlighting Arnett’s same sex comparator evidence, Judge Reed
further declared that Arnett had shown a prima facie case of discrimination
because: (1) she was a member of a protected subclass consisting of
151

Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
153 Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 2205 (MBM), 1998 WL 912101 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 30, 1998).
154 Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch., Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004).
155 Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1240.
156 Id. at 1236.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 1236−37.
159 See id. at 1237 (explaining that the defendants only sought summary judgment in
their favor with respect to the second count of Arnett’s complaint, which alleged sex-plusage discrimination under Title VII).
160 See id. at 1240−41 & n.8.
161 See Marc Chase McAllister, Extending the Sex Plus Discrimination Doctrine to Age
Discrimination Claims, 60 B.C. L. REV . 469, 487−92 (2019).
162 See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1240 (emphasis added).
152
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women over forty; (2) she was qualified for and applied for the positions in
question; (3) she was denied the positions, despite her qualifications; and
(4) other employees outside her protected “class” 163 or “discrete
subclass”164 were selected, “in this case two women under 40.” 165
Notably, Arnett is similar to Fisher, in that both plaintiffs presented
evidence that the position they sought—equal employment specialist in
Arnett, and a tenured faculty position in the hard sciences in Fisher—had
been filled only with women lacking the plus factor at issue, 166 and, at least
to some extent, opposite sex comparators possessing the same -plus
characteristic.167 Likewise, both plaintiffs presented evidence that not a
single sex-plus woman had previously obtained the position at issue during
the relevant time frame. 168 The Fisher court, however, overturned
judgment in the plaintiff’s favor due to a perceived lack of opposite sex
comparator evidence, whereas the Arnett court denied summary judgment
to the defendant based on similar evidence, 169 after which the Arnett parties
apparently settled the case. 170 Accordingly, although the procedural
posture of each case differs, the cases are in tension with respect to the type
of comparator evidence sufficient to support a sex-plus claim.
A few years after Arnett, the same court recognized a sex-plus claim
in McGrenaghan v. St. Denis School,171 despite the total absence of
opposite sex comparator evidence. In that case, plaintiff Sarah
McGrenaghan sued defendants, the St. Denis School and Archdiocese of
Philadelphia, “for allegedly removing her f rom a full-time teaching
position and refusing to rehire her to the position solely on the basis of”
having a disabled child.172 The defendants sought summary judgment on
McGrenaghan’s sex discrimination claim, arguing that she had failed to
163 See id. at 1239 (stating that “[f]or purposes of determining whether there was
disparate treatment [in a sex-plus case], the plaintiff’s class is defined as a subclass of
women, for example, women with preschool children”).
164 See id. at 1241 (stating that “[f]or purposes of determining whether the defendants’
discriminated against Arnett in violation of Title VII, I find she is a member of a discrete
subclass of ‘women over forty’”).
165 Id.
166 Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1442–43 (2d Cir. 1995), aff’d en banc, 114
F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997); Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1236–37.
167 Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1427; Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1236–37.
168 Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1427, 1442–43; Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1236–37.
169 Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1448; Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1240–41 & n.7.
170 The assumption that the parties settled the case is based on the author’s review of the
case docket, which includes an order dismissing the case with prejudice signed within a few
days after trial was scheduled to begin in the case, with no indication in the docket that trial
actually commenced. See Order Dismissing Action with Prejudice, Arnett v. Aspin, Civ. A.
No. 93–2065 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 1995), ECF No. 28.
171 McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
172 Id. at 325.
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produce evidence that she was treated less favorably on the basis of her
gender because (a) the person ultimately selected over her was also a
woman,173 and (b) she had no proof that the defendants treated males more
favorably than females. 174
In finding “ample evidence to establish a prima f acie case of ‘sexplus’ gender discrimination” against McGrenaghan’s particular subclass of
“women who have children with disabilities,” 175 the court pointed to two
items of evidence, neither of which involved opposite sex comparator
evidence.176 First, the court pointed to same sex comparator evidence by
noting that the person selected over the plaintiff was a less qualified female
who was “not the mother of a disabled child and therefore, not a member of
the subclass of women with disabled children.” 177 Second, the court
pointed to direct evidence of discriminatory animus against working
mothers and mothers with disabled children, including discriminatory
statements made by the school’s principal.178 The court thus rejected the
defendant’s argument that it could not be liable for sex discrimination on
the basis that the person hired for the position was also a woman. 179
As McGrenaghan shows, opposite sex comparator evidence is not
always required to raise an inference of sex-plus discrimination,
particularly where the plaintiff produces direct evidence of discriminatory
animus against her particular subgroup in combination with same sex
comparator evidence. Another similar district court decision, Trezza v.
Hartford, Inc.,180 further illustrates the relevance of same sex comparator
evidence in proving sex-plus claims.
In Trezza, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York considered a sex-plus claim brought by Joann Trezza, a woman
with two young children, based on allegations that her employer denied her

173

Id. at 326.
Id.
175 See id. at 327.
176 Id. Immediately before describing the “ample evidence” supporting the plaintiff’s
claim of sex-plus discrimination, the court also stated that the “plaintiff alleges . . . that
similar employment decisions would not have been made of a woman without a disabled
child or a father of a disabled child.” Id. Although this statement seemingly points to
opposite gender comparator evidence, the statement appears to be nothing more than a
description of the plaintiff’s allegations in the case, as it was made without citing any
evidence, which would be expected in an opinion denying summary judgment.
177 McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
178 Id. The court did not identify the particular discriminatory statements made by the
school’s principal.
179 Id.
Accordingly, the court denied summary judgment to the defendant on the
plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim. Id.
180 Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 2205 (MBM), 1998 WL 912101 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 30, 1998).
174
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promotions in favor of either women without children or men with
children.181 With respect to one promotion, which was awarded to a
woman without children, the defendant argued that Trezza’s sex-plus claim
should be dismissed because another woman received the promotion, such
that there could be no sex discrimination.182 The court promptly rejected
this attempt to use same sex comparator evidence defensively,183 noting that
the Supreme Court in Phillips had foreclosed this argument.184 Thus, rather
than defeating Trezza’s sex-plus discrimination claim, the court declared
that the employer’s rejection of Trezza in favor of another woman without
the relevant plus characteristic actually helped establish a prima facie case
of discrimination,185 which was further established through allegations that
her employer had treated men with children and women with children
differently in regards to promotions. 186 Thus, the combination of both
same sex and opposite sex comparator evidence proved critical to the
plaintiff’s sex-plus claim (at least in the context of defending a motion to
dismiss).
Finally, in a decision directly rejecting the view that sex-plus claims
must be supported by opposite sex comparator evidence (albeit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, rather than Title VII187 ), the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals found that a sex-plus plaintiff could prove her case through
stereotyped remarks about the employment abilities of women with
children, without presenting any opposite sex comparator evidence.188
181 See id. at *1–2 (describing three incidents where the plaintiff failed to earn a
promotion, which was instead awarded to either women without children or men with
children).
182 Id. at *5.
183 Id. at *6 (stating that “[w]hen a plaintiff alleges discrimination on the basis of sex in
conjunction with some other characteristic, the defendant’s selection of someone of the
same sex as plaintiff but without the added characteristic . . . . [may not be used to] defeat an
otherwise legitimate inference of discrimination—the essence of a plaintiff’s prima facie
case”).
184 See id. (stating “the point of Phillips and its progeny is that a defendant should not be
able to escape liability for discrimination on the basis of sex merely by hiring some
members of the protected group”).
185 See id. (declaring that “[t]his court is not the first to conclude that a plaintiff in a sexplus discrimination case can establish a prima [facie] case of discrimination where she was
rejected in favor of a member of the same sex without the relevant additional
characteristic”).
186 Id. at *7.
187 See Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118–19 (2d
Cir. 2004) (finding that “sex plus” discrimination is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
because “the Equal Protection Clause forbids sex discrimination no matter how it is
labeled,” such that “[t]he relevant issue is . . . whether the plaintiff provides evidence of
purposefully sex-discriminatory acts”).
188 See id. at 118–22. See also id. at 113 (stating the issue in the case as “whether
stereotyping about the qualities of mothers is a form of gender discrimination, and whether
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In that case, the Second Circuit considered a discrimination claim
brought by school psychologist, Elana Back, after she was denied tenure
due to an alleged stereotypical view that young mothers could not balance
both work and home obligations.189 In reversing the lower court’s grant of
summary judgment to the individuals instrumental in denying Back tenure,
the Second Circuit relied primarily on statements made by those
individuals that stereotyped her “as a woman and mother of young
children,” which showed that they “treated her differently than they would
have treated a man and father of young children.” 190 These stereotyped
remarks included a statement that a woman “cannot ‘be a good mother’”
while holding a job that requires long hours and a statement that a mother
who was awarded tenure “would not show the same level of commitment
[she] had shown [before earning tenure] because [she] had little ones at
home.” 191 These and similar remarks, according to the court, demonstrated
that the decisionmakers had denied Back tenure based on stereotyped
generalizations regarding the inability of women with children to combine
work and motherhood, rather than because of Back’s actual qualifications,
evidence that was alone enough to avoid summary judgment.192
Just as importantly, the Back court rejected the defendants’ argument
that opposite sex comparator evidence is required to prove a sex -plus
discrimination claim. In one passage, for example, the court described the
issue in the case as “whether stereotyping about the qualities of mothers is
a form of gender discrimination, and whether this can be determined in the
absence of evidence about how the employer in question treated
fathers[,]” 193 in other words, in the absence of opposite sex comparato r
evidence. The court “answer[ed] both questions in the affirmative.” 194
Later, the court again rejected the defendants’ argument that stereotypes
about pregnant women or mothers cannot be presumed to be on the basis of
sex “without comparative evidence of what was said about fathers.”195 The
court declared the defendants to be “wrong in their contention that [a
this can be determined in the absence of evidence about how the employer in question
treated fathers,” and “answer[ing] both questions in the affirmative”).
189 See id. See also id. at 115 (describing the alleged stereotyping behavior). Notably,
Back brought her sex discrimination claim under the Equal Protection Clause, which the
court found to encompass sex plus claims. See id. at 118–19.
190 See id. at 124, 130 (analyzing the evidence of discriminatory motives and comments
of the plaintiff’s supervisors, Brennan and Wishnie).
191 Id. at 120. See also id. at 115 (summarizing a host of seemingly discriminatory
statements).
192 See id. at 120. Notably, the court denied summary judgment only to the actual
decisionmakers in Back’s case. See id. at 113.
193 Back, 365 F.3d at 113.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 121.
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plaintiff like] Back cannot make out a claim that survives summary
judgment unless she demonstrates that the defendants treated similarly
situated men differently.” 196 Thus, although Back had “proffered no
evidence about the treatment of male administrators with young children,”
this was not fatal to her claim, as “there is no requirement that such
evidence be adduced.”197 Rather, what matters is “the [employer’s] reasons
for the individual plaintiff’s treatment,” 198 evidenced by the employer’s
“stereotypical remarks about the incompatibility of motherhood and
employment.” 199 Accordingly, the court declared, “stereotyping of women
as caregivers can by itself and without more be evidence of an
impermissible, sex-based motive.” 200
VI. PROPOSALS
As the previous two sections have shown, courts disagree as to
whether opposite sex comparator evidence is required to prove a sex -plus
discrimination claim. 201 On the one hand, cases like Coleman declare that
“gender-plus plaintiffs can never be successful if there is no corresponding
subclass of members of the opposite gender” because, in that event, such
plaintiffs “cannot make the requisite showing that they were treated
differently from similarly situated members of the opposite gender,” a
necessary component of any sex discrimination claim. 202 On the other
hand, cases like Back have openly rejected the purported opposite sex
comparator requirement, finding instead that the requisite discriminatory
intent can be proven in other ways. 203 This section resolves this dispute,
and more broadly delineates the proper role for comparator evidence in
sex-plus cases.

196
197
198

Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir.

2001)).
199

Back, 365 F.3d at 122.
Id. at 122. Later still, the court reiterated this point when discussing the
requirements of the McDonnell Douglas test. See id. at 124 (“[A]s with the first stage of
McDonnell Douglas, Back is not required to provide evidence that similarly situated men
were treated differently[.]”).
201 See Gee-Thomas v. Cingular Wireless, 324 F. Supp. 2d 875, 884 n.6 (M.D. Tenn.
2004).
202 Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 1997).
203 Back, 365 F.3d at 121. Likewise, cases like Fisher have noted that when no opposite
sex comparator exists in a given workforce, a sex-plus plaintiff may instead provide “some
other evidence of discrimination” beyond comparator proof. See Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70
F.3d 1420, 1447 n.12 (2d Cir. 1995), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997).
200
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A. The Proper Role of Comparator Evidence in Sex-Plus
Discrimination Cases
This subsection presents a series of proposals regarding the role of
opposite sex and same sex comparator evidence in proving sex -plus
discrimination. The subsection to follow examines other means of proving
sex-plus discrimination beyond comparator proof.
First, this Article contends that opposite sex comparator evidence is
indeed essential in cases where a plaintiff attempts to prove sex -plus
discrimination solely through comparator evidence. As noted, opposite sex
comparator evidence focuses on the employer’s treatment of a person of the
opposite sex as the plaintiff who shares the same plus characteristic.
Opposite sex comparator evidence would include, for example, evidence
that an employer refuses to hire women with children (the plaintiff) , but
routinely hires men with children (the opposite sex comparator). As cases
like Coleman,204 Fisher,205 and Fuller206 suggest, such comparator evidence
is required—at least in cases where a plaintiff attempts to prove sex-plus
discrimination through comparator evidence—because evidence regarding
an employer’s more favorable treatment of an opposite sex comparator is
needed to prove that the plaintiff’s sex played a factor in the employer’s
decision.207 After all, Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the
basis of an innocuous plus factor, such as marital status, but this would be
the only inference that would arise in a case where a married woman relies
exclusively on evidence showing only that she was treated less favorably
than unmarried women. 208 Moreover, courts have routinely determined,
based on the plain text of Title VII, that there can be no actionable claim of
sex discrimination, which includes sex-plus allegations, without proof that
members of one sex were treated less favorably or subject to different
employment standards than members of the opposite sex. 209 As such,
204

See Coleman, 108 F.3d at 1203–04.
See Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1447.
206 See Fuller v. GTE Corp./Contel Cellular, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 653, 657–58 (M.D.
Tenn. 1996).
207 See Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1446 (rejecting sex-plus claim for lack of opposite gender
comparator evidence and stating that “[t]o establish that Vassar discriminated on the basis of
sex plus marital status, plaintiff must show that married men were treated differently from
married women”) (emphasis in original), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997);
Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 158 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The central question in
any employment-discrimination case is whether the employer would have taken the same
action had the employee been of a different race (age, sex, religion, national origin, etc.) and
everything else had remained the same.”).
208 See Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1447.
209 See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (declaring that
Title VII “requires that persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities
irrespective of their sex,” such that the statute does not permit “one hiring policy for women
205
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opposite sex comparator evidence is a necessary component of any sex plus discrimination claim proven through comparator evidence.
Fisher provides a helpful illustration. In that case, professor Cynthia
Fisher sued her former employer, Vassar College, for sex -plus-marital
status discrimination for having denied her tenure. 210 At trial, Fisher
presented statistical evidence purporting to show that no married female
professor in the hard sciences had been granted tenure in the three decades
before Fisher was denied tenure, whereas the majority of single women in
the hard sciences had been granted tenure during the same time period. 211
Assuming the truth of these allegations, and without any comparator
evidence regarding how married males were treated, the only thing Fisher’s
data would prove is that Vassar College discriminated against professors on
the basis of marital status. 212 But discrimination on the basis of marital
status is not, in and of itself, prohibited by Title VII. 213 Accordingly, in
order to prove sex discrimination through comparator evidence, plaintiffs
like Fisher must present evidence showing that similarly-situated males are
treated differently.214 As the Fisher court declared, “[a]bsent this sex -tosex comparison on a statistically sound basis, plaintiff’s [same sex
comparator evidence is] meaningless.”215
For similar reasons, this Article further contends that same sex
comparator evidence alone cannot raise an inference of sex discrimination,
because same sex comparator evidence, by itself, cannot generate any
inference of sex discrimination. 216 This point is made clear in Philipsen v.
and another for men”); King v. Ferguson Enters., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1209 (N.D.
Ga. 2013) (“Despite its name, the ultimate question in these cases ‘is whether the employer
took an adverse employment action at least in part because of an employee’s sex.’”), aff’d,
568 F. App’x 686 (11th Cir. 2014); DeAngelo v. DentalEZ, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 572, 584
(E.D. Pa. 2010) (recognizing that, “[a]t its root, . . . ‘sex-plus’ discrimination is simply a
form of gender discrimination,” requiring the plaintiff to present sufficient evidence of sex
discrimination).
210 Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1426.
211 See supra note 129.
212 Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1447.
213 Id. See also King, 971 F. Supp. 2d at 1215 (“[I]f a woman [claiming sex-plus
discrimination] cannot show that her employer treats the same subclass of men differently,
then gender is not a factor; moreover, allowing her claim without such evidence would
result in the protection of the characteristic rather than gender.”); Chadwick v. WellPoint,
Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2009) (recognizing that Title VII prohibits discrimination
based on sex, but “does not prohibit discrimination based on caregiving responsibility”).
214 See Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1446–47.
215 Id. at 1446.
216 See id. at 1446–47. See also Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d
1199, 1202–05 (10th Cir. 1997) (in sex-plus-marital status claim, ruling that a female
plaintiff must show that her male co-workers with the same marital status were treated
differently, and reversing jury verdict for the plaintiff due to a lack of evidence on that
point).
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University of Michigan Board of Regents, which rejected the plaintiff’s
claim that her job offer was rescinded based on her sex and parental status
as a mother with young children. 217 Applying the McDonnell Douglas
test,218 the defendant argued that plaintiff could not establish a prima f acie
case of sex-plus discrimination because she had failed to identify male
employees with young children who were treated differently —in other
words, she had failed to produce opposite sex comparator evidence. 219 In
response, the plaintiff argued that she had satisfied her burden by showing
that women in her workplace were treated differently depending on
whether they had children—in other words, that same sex comparator
evidence would suffice. 220 The court agreed with the defendant, 221 adding
that accepting the plaintiff’s argument “would turn this gender
discrimination case into a parental discrimination case,” which is not
unlawful under federal law. 222
In sum, when a plaintiff attempts to prove sex-plus discrimination
through comparator evidence, it is not enough to point to same sex
comparator evidence without also providing evidence of how similarly
situated persons of the opposite sex were treated. 223 Although same sex
comparator evidence has an important role to play in sex-plus claims and
can appear persuasive, given its ability to expose discrimination against a
particular subgroup of males or females, such evidence is simply not
capable, in and of itself, of demonstrating the requisite sex

217 Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-11977-DT, 2007 WL 907822
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007).
218 The Philipsen court first considered whether the plaintiff could prove her case with
direct evidence of discrimination. The plaintiff, who disclosed during her interview that she
was the mother of two young children, id. at *1, argued that the following statement made
by one of her interviewers constituted direct evidence of discrimination: “I’ve got an offer
for you. Before I give it to you, I have a question . . . Are you sure you don’t want to stay at
home to be with your children.” Id. at *2, *5. The court found this statement, although
“perhaps not . . . appropriate,” was not direct evidence of discrimination, as “it does not
necessarily evince a discriminatory intent,” “does not require the conclusion, without any
additional inferences, that [d]efendant discriminated against [p]laintiff on the basis of her
status was a mother with young children,” and “does not compel a reasonable factfinder to
conclude that [p]laintiff’s job offer was rescinded [several days later] for discriminatory
reasons.” Id. at *5.
219 Id. at *6.
220 Id.
221 See id. (noting that both parties cited cases supporting their respective positions, but
that “the court is more persuaded by those that require the comparator to be outside of the
protected class”).
222 Id. at *8.
223 See Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d at 1446 (2d Cir. 1995) (calling the plaintiff’s
same sex comparator evidence “meaningless” in the absence of opposite gender comparator
evidence), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997).
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discrimination.224
This is not to suggest, however, that same sex comparator evidence is
not relevant in proving sex-plus discrimination. Indeed, when paired with
opposite sex comparator evidence, same sex comparator evidence reveals
that the employer does not engage in sex discrimination across-the-board,
but rather employs a more specific sex-based animus targeting only a
particular subgroup of male or female employees, thereby establishing the
claim as a sex-plus claim rather than a pure sex discrimination claim. 225
For this reason, this Article contends that the strongest sex -plus
discrimination claims are those where the two types of comparator
evidence are used in tandem.
Take, for example, the facts of Lam v. University of Hawaii, a case in
which the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized
a Title VII sex-plus-race claim brought by an Asian woman of Vietnamese
descent.226 In that case, Maivan Clech Lam sued the University of
Hawaii’s Law School claiming that it discriminated against her on the basis
of her race and sex when it twice rejected her application for a faculty
position.227 After Lam lost at trial, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
found it erroneous for the district court to have relied on the defendants’
favorable treatment of two other candidates for the faculty position at issue:
one an Asian man (tending to defeat a claim of pure race discrimination),
and the other a white woman (tending to defeat a claim of pure sex
discrimination). 228 According to the Ninth Circuit, the district court
apparently viewed racism and sexism as “distinct elements amenable to
almost mathematical treatment, so that evaluating discrimination against an
Asian woman became a simple matter of performing two separate tasks:
looking for racism ‘alone’ and looking for sexism ‘alone,’ with Asian men
and white women as the corresponding model victims.”229 This slicing and
dicing of Lam’s plus discrimination claim, according to the Ninth Circuit,
failed to account for the fact that “Asian women are subject to a set of
stereotypes and assumptions shared neither by Asian men nor by white
women,” 230 such that Asian women may be targeted for discrimination
224 See Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d at 43 (1st Cir. 2009) (in a sex-plus case,
declaring that “regardless of the label given to the claim, the simple question posed by sex
discrimination suits is whether the employer took an adverse employment action at least in
part because of an employee’s sex”).
225 Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
226 Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1561–62, n.16.
227 Id. at 1554. Lam also alleged national origin discrimination, id. at 1554, but the
Ninth Circuit focused on her allegations of race and sex discrimination, id. at 1559–60.
228 Id. at 1561.
229 Id.
230 Here, the court noted in a footnote that Asian women are subject to particular
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“even in the absence of discrimination against [Asian] men or white
women.”231 Accordingly, the court determined that “when a plaintiff is
claiming race and sex bias, it is necessary to determine whether the
employer discriminates on the basis of that combination of factors, not just
whether it discriminates against people of the same race or of the same
sex.”232
In sex-plus terms, Lam claimed that she belonged to a particular
subgroup of women, those who are Asian, that were the target of the
defendant’s unique discriminatory animus. To prove the alleged bias, a
plaintiff like Lam could invoke both opposite sex and same sex comparator
evidence. Regarding opposite sex comparator evidence, Lam might present
evidence that the defendant refused to hire Asian women, but had no such
policy with respect to the relevant opposite sex comparator sharing the
same plus factor as Lam: men who are Asian. Regarding same sex
comparator evidence, Lam might present additional evidence that the
defendant readily hired the same sex comparator lacking the relevant plus
factor pertaining to Lam’s race, including the subgroup of women who are
Caucasian. After all, it is this combination of evidence that best proves
discrimination against the subgroup of women who are Asian, as opposed
to women on the whole. Accordingly, while the Lam defendant had
attempted to use both types of comparator evidence defensively, the lesson
of Lam is that such evidence can instead be used offensively, as a means of
proving the defendant’s discriminatory intent against the particular
subgroup of women at issue: Asian women. And importantly, this analysis
is not unique to “plus” factors involving immutable characteristics, as this
same analysis can be applied to the sex-plus cases outlined above with
“plus” factors involving fundamental rights, including Phillips,233
McGrenaghan,234 and Trezza.235
To be sure, the evidentiary function of same sex comparator
evidence—exposing an instance of discrimination against only a particular
subgroup women—might appear to overlap with that of opposite sex
comparator evidence, making same sex comparator evidence redundant and
unnecessary. Under the facts of Lam, for example, if evidence shows that
the defendant-employer does not hire Asian women, but hires Asian men,
that evidence might both prove that sex discrimination had occurred

stereotypes such as geisha, dragon lady, concubine, and lotus blossom. Id. at 1562 n.21.
231 Id. at 1562 (quoting Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025,
1032 (5th Cir. 1980)).
232 Id. at 1562 (emphasis in original).
233 See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
234 See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
235 See supra notes 180–186 and accompanying text.
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(because, in the words of Phillips, the employer is utilizing “one hiring
policy for women and another for men”), 236 and suggest that the
discrimination is occurring at the subgroup level (because the comparison
being made is between Asian women and Asian men, rather than women
and men on the whole). In this respect, same sex comparator evidence,
which performs the evidentiary function of exposing discrimination at the
subgroup level, might appear duplicative and therefore unnecessary. But
this is incorrect. Sticking with the facts of Lam, a simple comparison of the
hiring policies between Asian women and Asian men does not indicate,
either way, whether all other women and all other men are likewise subject
to the same hiring policies. Depending on other evidence, it could be that
this employer does not hire only Asian women, or that this employer does
not hire women at all, or even that this employer does not hire Asian and
Hispanic women. More evidence is needed to know exactly what claim a
plaintiff like Lam should pursue: pure sex discrimination, or sex -plus
discrimination. Same sex comparator evidence provides the missing link,
because if it turns out that this employer readily hires women who are not
Asian, then the proper claim becomes sex-plus-race discrimination against
the subset of women who are Asian. In this sense, same sex comparator
evidence is always relevant in proving sex-plus discrimination, and should
not be so easily discounted. 237
Even courts that seemingly mandate opposite sex comparator
evidence have admitted the relevance of same sex comparator evidence.
Recall that in Fisher,238 for example, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
found clear error in the district court’s reliance on plaintiff Fisher’s same
sex comparator evidence, 239 which the court described as “meaningless” in
the absence of a proper “sex-to-sex comparison.” 240 Despite this ruling, in
other portions of its opinion, the Second Circuit recognized the usefulness
of same sex comparator evidence. The court emphasized, for example, that
236 See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 544 (1971) (declaring that Title VII
“requires that persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespective
of their sex,” such that the statute does not permit “one hiring policy for women and another
for men”).
237 See F ED . R. EVID . 401 (providing that “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b)
the fact is of consequence in determining the action”); FED . R. EVID . 402 (stating that
“[r]elevant evidence is [generally] admissible . . . .”); FED . R. EVID . 403 (stating the familiar
rule that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence”).
238 Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420 (2d Cir. 1995), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d
Cir. 1997).
239 Id. at 1443.
240 Id. at 1446.
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the plaintiff’s statistics, which had focused on her employer’s treatment of
married versus single women in the “hard” sciences only, should have
instead examined the employer’s treatment of married and single women in
the college as a whole.241 Indeed, the Second Circuit declared, “[e]vidence
of the treatment of married women throughout the college was highly
relevant to a proper assessment of plaintiff’s [sex-plus] claim.” 242 After all,
if the employer in Fisher had treated all women alike, the plaintiff’s best
argument would have been pure sex discrimination, rather than sex -plusmarital status, again demonstrating the relevance of same sex comparator
proof.
B. Beyond Comparators: Other Methods of Proving Sex-Plus
Discrimination
As noted, sex-plus discrimination claims typically allege disparate
treatment discrimination, which requires proof of discriminatory intent. 243
For such claims, direct or circumstantial evidence may be used to prove the
requisite intent.244 Comparator proof is simply one form of circumstantial
evidence.245 Accordingly, the employer’s intent can be proven in other
241

See id. at 1445 (finding the district court to have abused its discretion in failing to
receive the defendant’s expert testimony on such college-wide data, and stating that the
college-wide evidence excluded in the case “strongly suggests that . . . there was no
discrimination against married women in the tenure review process”).
242 Id. at 1445.
243 See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text.
244 See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3 (1983) (“As
in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or circumstantial evidence. The
trier of fact should consider all the evidence, giving it whatever weight and credence it
deserves.”); Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2019) (“In
order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff alleging intentional discrimination must
present sufficient facts to permit a jury to rule in her favor. One way that she can do so is by
satisfying the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas.”); id. at 1220 n.6
(noting further that, beyond the burden-shifting test of McDonnell Douglas, “[a] plaintiff
can also present direct evidence of discriminatory intent, or demonstrate a ‘convincing
mosaic’ of circumstantial evidence that warrants an inference of intentional discrimination”)
(citations omitted); Darke v. Lurie Besikof Lapidus & Co., 550 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1040 (D.
Minn. 2008) (explaining that there are basically two ways to prove sex discrimination: (1)
the direct method, and (2) the indirect method described in McDonnell Douglas). Notably,
statistical evidence may be used as circumstantial evidence of the employer’s intent to
discriminate, especially in systemic, pattern-or-practice cases. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339–40 (1977) (affirming the use of statistical evidence in
proving employment discrimination); Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1274
(11th Cir. 2008) (noting that “[a] plaintiff may prove a claim of intentional discrimination
through direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or through statistical proof”); Fisher, 70
F.3d at 1442 (recognizing that “[s]tatistics may be a part of a plaintiff’s effort to establish
discrimination under a theory of disparate treatment”). Nevertheless, a detailed analysis of
such statistical proof is beyond the scope of this Article.
245 See Bass v. Chem. Banking Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8833 (SHS), 1996 WL 374151, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1996); Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir.
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ways, including through direct evidence of discrimination against a
particular subgroup of males or females, or through other forms of
circumstantial evidence (as a variety of sex-plus cases have established). 246
Thus, although some courts have stated that opposite sex comparator
evidence is always required to prove sex-plus discrimination, 247 this is
incorrect. Rather, when a sex-plus plaintiff lacks the requisite opposite sex
comparator evidence, she may still prevail through other evidentiary
methods.248 As one court recently declared, proof that an employer treated
2011) (in a race discrimination case, stating that “the plaintiff’s failure to produce a
comparator does not necessarily doom the plaintiff’s case,” “[r]ather, the plaintiff will
always survive summary judgment” by presenting sufficient circumstantial evidence, which
comes in “various forms,” of the employer’s discriminatory intent). See also, e,g., Rioux,
520 F.3d at 1277 (finding the plaintiff established a prima facie case of race discrimination
through various items of circumstantial evidence, despite having no evidence of a
comparator who was treated more favorably).
246 See, e.g., DeAngelo v. DentalEZ, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 572, 584–86 (E.D. Pa. 2010)
(stating that even in the absence of opposite sex comparator evidence, a plaintiff “may still
proceed on a sex-plus theory if she has direct record evidence of gender discrimination”);
Rauw v. Glickman, No. CV-99-1482-ST, 2001 WL 34039494, at *11 (D. Or. Aug. 6, 2001)
(denying summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiff’s sex-plus-marital status
claim, and noting that plaintiff’s direct evidence “establishes a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether improper sex plus marital status discrimination was a factor in the elimination
of [plaintiff’s] position”); Nesselrotte v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., No. 06-01390, 2009 WL
703395, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2009) (in a sex-plus-dependent children claim, requiring
a female plaintiff to present evidence regarding the corresponding subclass of men, but
noting that the plaintiff could rely on evidence “of any other circumstances, such as
impermissible stereotyping, that raise an inference of gender discrimination under Title
VII”) (citing Back, 365 F.3d at 122); McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323, 327
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (finding ample evidence of a prima facie case of sex-plus discrimination
claim brought by a female with a disabled child, despite no opposite sex comparator
evidence, based on evidence that the person hired over her was a female without a disabled
child and due to discriminatory statements targeting working mothers and mothers with
disabled children) (discussed supra notes 171–179); Bass, 1996 WL 374151 at *6 (finding
that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and permit a factfinder to
infer a discriminatory motive, based not only on opposite sex comparator evidence, but also
by “demonstrating that . . . her performance was criticized in gender-specific language,”
“the employer made invidious remarks about other members of the protected class,” or that
“the sequence of events leading up to the discharge or the timing of the discharge raises an
inference of discrimination”) (citations omitted). Cf. Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 350, 351 (6th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that a plaintiff may prove
discrimination, even in the absence of comparator evidence, through direct, circumstantial,
or statistical evidence tending to show that the employer singled out the plaintiff for
impermissible reasons).
247 See supra Part III. Recall that in Coleman, for example, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals declared that “gender-plus plaintiffs can never be successful if there is no
corresponding subclass of members of the opposite gender,” because without such
comparator evidence, sex-plus “plaintiffs cannot make the requisite showing that they were
treated differently from similarly situated members of the opposite gender,” a key
component of any “sex” discrimination claim. Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo.,
Inc,, 108 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 1997).
248 Johnston v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, No. 08-CV-0296 PJS/RLE, 2009 WL 2900352, at
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an opposite sex comparator better than a sex-plus plaintiff “would be one
way for [a plaintiff] to prove sex-plus discrimination, but it would not be
the only way.”249
According to most courts, circumstantial evidence of discrimination—
which includes comparator proof—is only required where direct evidence
of discriminatory intent is lacking. 250
For this reason, courts often address whether direct evidence of
discriminatory intent is present bef ore examining comparator proof. 251
Thus, it is no surprise that courts have validated sex-plus claims based on
direct evidence of discrimination, even where opposite sex comparator
evidence is lacking. 252
Perhaps the most common form of direct evidence in sex-plus cases is
stereotypical remarks about women with children and their perceived
capacity to be good employees. In Back, for example, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals found that Back could prove her sex-plus claim solely
through evidence of stereotypical remarks about the ability of women with
children to be good employees, 253 which the court described as direct
evidence of discriminatory intent. 254 As the Back court declared,
“stereotyping of women as caregivers can by itself and without more be
evidence of an impermissible, sex-based motive.”255
The First Circuit Court of Appeals reached the same result in
Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc. 256 In that case, the First Circuit overturned the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant -employer on
the plaintiff’s sex-plus claim alleging she did not receive a promotion

*9 (D. Minn. Sept. 2, 2009).
249 Id. See also Goldberg, supra note 15, at 751 (arguing that compartor evidence is just
one way of discerning an act of discrimination).
250 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (“[T]he
McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of
discrimination[.]”); Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 58 (1st Cir. 1999)
(describing the “the purpose” of “the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework” as “allowing
plaintiffs to prove discrimination by circumstantial evidence”). See also supra note 49.
251 See, e.g., supra note 218 (discussing Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No.
06-CV-11977-DT, 2007 WL 907822 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007)).
252 See supra note 244 (listing cases).
253 See supra notes 187–200 and accompanying text.
254 Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch., Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 119, 124 (2d Cir.
2004) (describing the alleged stereotypical comments about a woman’s inability to combine
work and motherhood as “direct evidence” of discrimination).
255 Id. at 122.
Later still, the court reiterated this point when discussing the
requirements of the McDonnell Douglas test. See id. at 124 (“[A]s with the first stage of
McDonnell Douglas, Back is not required to provide evidence that similarly situated men
were treated differently.”).
256 Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2009).
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because she was the mother of young children. 257 Importantly, the court
reached this result even though the person who received the promotion over
her was also a mother with young children.258 Thus, without any
comparator evidence, and even despite the employer’s favorable treatment
of another female sharing the same plus characteristic as the plaintiff,
which arguably undercut the plaintiff’s claim, 259 the Chadwick plaintiff was
still able to survive summary judgment based solely on stereotypical
comments suggesting that the plaintiff would not devote herself to her job
due to childcare responsibilities. 260
Numerous other courts have also noted the ability of sex -plus
plaintiffs to prove their claims with direct evidence, without the need f or
opposite sex comparator proof. 261 Accordingly, stereotypical comments
such as those at issue in Back and Chadwick are simply another means,
apart from comparator proof, of raising an inference of sex discrimination,
a point made clear by the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins.262
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court ruled that Title VII’s
prohibition of sex discrimination encompasses employment decisions based
on gender stereotypes. 263 In that case, plaintiff Ann Hopkins, a female
senior manager in an accounting firm, was denied partnership because she
was considered “too macho.” Along these lines, the plaintiff was told she
could improve her chances of partnership if she were to “take a course at
charm school,” “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more

257

Id. at 40–41.
At the time of the promotion decision, plaintiff Laurie Chadwick was the mother of
an eleven-year-old son and six-year-old triplets in kindergarten. Id. at 42. The person who
received the promotion over Chadwick, Donna Ouelette, was apparently the mother of two
children, ages nine and fourteen. Id. at 41–42. In rejecting the defendant’s argument that
hiring Ouelette tended to defeat any sex-plus claim Chadwick might assert based on the fact
of her having children, the court noted a possible distinction between Chadwick, who had
four children, and Ouelette, who had only two. See id. at 42–43 n.4 (noting further that no
evidence suggested the defendant-employer actually knew of Ouelette’s status as a mother
of two children, while it is uncontested that the defendant-employer knew of Chadwick’s
children, and stating that, regardless, “discrimination against one employee cannot be
remedied solely by nondiscrimination against another employee in that same group”).
259 See Fuller v. GTE Corp./Contel Cellular, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 653, 657 (M.D. Tenn.
1996) (rejecting the plaintiff’s sex-plus-parental status claim and noting the fact “[t]hat
[p]laintiff was replaced by another female—indeed, by another mother—is simply one
factor which helps to defeat [p]laintiff’s claim”).
260 See Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 46–48.
261 See supra note 244.
262 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (stating that “stereotyped
remarks can certainly be evidence that gender played a part” in an adverse employment
decision) (emphasis in original).
263 Id. at 250–52.
258
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femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.” 264 The
Supreme Court ruled that such comments could support a Title VII claim of
sex discrimination, thereby establishing that Title VII prohibits sex
discrimination in the form of sex stereotyping. 265 As the Back court later
declared, “[i]t is the law, then, that ‘stereotyped remarks can certainly be
evidence that gender played a part’ in an adverse employment decision.” 266
As courts and commentators have noted, the stereotyping directed at
Ann Hopkins, who was denied partnership for failing to look and act the
way a woman should look and act, followed the supposition that a woman
is unqualified for a position because she does not conform to a gender
stereotype.267 This is distinct from more traditional forms of stereotyping
in discrimination cases, more commonly at issue in sex-plus cases, in
which an employer assumes a person will be a bad employee simply
because she has certain qualities (such as being married, or having
children), and takes an adverse action against her due to that stereotypical
assumption.268
This brings us back to Coleman, where the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals declared that “gender-plus plaintiffs can never be successful if
there is no corresponding subclass of members of the opposite gender,”
because in that event, sex-plus plaintiffs “cannot make the requisite
showing that they were treated differently from similarly situated members
of the opposite gender.” 269 This is incorrect, and should not be regarded as
the law in sex-plus cases.270
To explain, it is certainly true that a female plaintiff alleging sex-plus
discrimination must establish that she was discriminated against based on
her sex, “which is, analytically, equivalent to establishing that a similarly
situated man would not have been discriminated against if such a man
264

Id. at 235 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 250 (“In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the
basis of gender.”).
266 Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch., Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 119 (2d Cir.
2004) (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251).
267 See id.; Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1262 (11th Cir. 2017)
(Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the accounting firm
in Price Waterhouse denied Hopkins’s partnership because “she had qualities that defied
stereotypes of how women should look and act”). See also Zachary R. Herz, Price’s
Progress: Sex Stereotyping and Its Potential for Antidiscrimination Law, 124 YALE L.J.
396, 406–07 (2014) (describing Price Waterhouse).
268 See Back, 365 F.3d at 119. See also Herz, supra note 267 (describing the type of
stereotyping at issue in Hopkins as “prescriptive stereotyping,” and the type of stereotyping
at issue in a sex-plus case like Phillips as “ascriptive stereotyping”).
269 Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 1997).
270 See Johnston v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, No. 08-CV-0296 PJS/RLE, 2009 WL
2900352, at *9 n.11 (D. Minn. Sept. 2, 2009) (explaining the flaws in this statement).
265
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existed.” 271 “[I]t does not follow that [the sex-plus plaintiff] must be able
to prove that a particular similarly situated man was in fact treated better
than she,” 272 however, as this ignores the lessons of Price Waterhouse and
sex-plus cases like Chadwick and Back, which permit a plaintiff to prove
sex discrimination in other ways.273 Accordingly, although a plaintiff
might attempt to prove sex-plus discrimination with evidence that an
employer has in fact treated similarly situated males and females
differently, other types of evidence—even including other forms of
circumstantial evidence—can accomplish the same result. 274
Notably, when one examines the stereotyped comments in sex -plus
cases like Chadwick and Back, embedded within those comments are hints
of opposite sex and same sex comparator evidence, thereby generating a
similar inference of discriminatory intent and providing the requisite
evidence of differential treatment between the sexes. Suppose, for
example, that an employer makes the following comment to a female
employee who just had a child: “You are the best credit analyst we have
ever had, and you were especially great before you started having kids.
Although I don’t mind when men with children work, I really don’t think
that women with children should be working, so I’ve decided to f ire you
immediately. Please collect your belongings and go.” 275 Undoubtedly, if
these events occurred, a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff was
fired because of her sex. 276 After all, the employer’s comment alone is

271

Id. at *9.
Id.
273 See Back, 365 F.3d at 119 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251
(1989)).
274 See King v. Ferguson Enters., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1217 (N.D. Ga. 2013)
(stating that plaintiffs in the Eleventh Circuit “can establish a prima facie case—without
identifying a similarly situated comparator—by offering circumstantial evidence that
suggests their employer intentionally discriminated against them ‘with a force similar to that
implied by treating nearly identical offenders differently’”) (quoting Bell v. Crowne Mgmt.,
LLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1234 (S.D. Ala. 2012)); see also Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d
1420, 1447 n.12 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing that when evidence shows “there are no
[similarly situated] males [with the same plus factor at issue] and that it is unlikely that there
would be any, then it may be that the complainant would be able to prevail by providing
some other evidence of discrimination”), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997). Even
proof of pretext can constitute evidence that an employer was motivated by discriminatory
animus, as opposed to whatever alternative motivation the employer presents. See Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (stating that “[p]roof that the
defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial
evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive,” as
this proof allows a trier of fact to “reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that
the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose”).
275 This hypothetical is adapted from a similar scenario provided in Johnston, 2009 WL
2900352 at *7.
276 Id. at *9.
272
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evidence that the plaintiff was fired not because of her abilities, but rather
because of her sex in combination with her parental status. As the quoted
comment alone suggests, men with children and women without children
would not have suffered the same consequences. Thu s, it is simply
incorrect to state, as the Tenth Circuit has declared, that “gender-plus
plaintiffs can never be successful if there is no corresponding subclass of
members of the opposite gender.”277
Aside from the failure to account for other forms of persuasive
evidence, the Tenth Circuit’s rule unnecessarily hamstrings plaintiffs who
are unlucky enough to have any opposite sex comparators in their
workforce, a problem that can be particularly acute when sex -plus
discrimination is alleged (given its level of specificity).278 This point was
made explicit in a recent First Circuit Court of Appeals decision applying
the sex-plus doctrine in a case alleging a sexually hostile work
environment, Franchina v. City of Providence.279
In Franchina, a former Providence, Rhode Island, employee, Lori
Franchina, sued the City asserting a Title VII sexual harassment claim. 280
After losing at trial, 281 the City argued on appeal that Franchina f ailed to
present sufficient evidence under a sex-plus theory because she fa iled to
“identify a corresponding sub-class of the opposite gender and show that
the corresponding class was not subject to similar harassment or
discrimination.” 282 The First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the City’s
argument for numerous reasons. 283 First, the court declared that the City’s
argument, if accepted, “would permit employers to discriminate free from
Title VII recourse so long as they do not employ any subclass member of
the opposite gender,” a result that would “be inapposite to Title VII’s

277

Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 1997).
See Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 52−53 (1st Cir. 2018). See also
Goldberg, supra note 15, at 764–65 (arguing that plaintiffs in “trait-plus cases” are
particularly unlikely to find an adequate comparator in their workforce).
279 See id. at 45−46 (summarizing Franchina’s claims). See also Brief of PlaintiffAppellee Lori Franchina at 26, Franchina, 881 F.3d 32 (2017) (No. 16-2401).
280 Franchina, 881 F.3d at 37, 45−46.
281 Id. at 37−38.
282 Id. at 52.
More specifically, the City argued, Franchina “is required to have
presented evidence at trial of a comparative class of gay male firefighters who were not
discriminated against,” because without such evidence, “it would not be possible to prove
that any sort of differential treatment a plaintiff experiences is necessarily predicated on his
or her gender.” Id.
283 See id. at 52 (stating that the City’s argument “has some rather obvious flaws”). But
see Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1202–04 (10th Cir. 1997)
(ruling in a sex-plus-marital status claim that a female plaintiff must show that her male coworkers with the same marital status were treated differently, and reversing jury verdict for
the plaintiff due to a lack of evidence on that point).
278
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mandate against sex-based discrimination.”284 In a related point, the court
declared that “Title VII is not to be diluted because discrimination
adversely affects a plaintiff who is unlucky enough to lack a comparator in
his or her workplace.”285
In the final analysis, sex discrimination claims require proof that “the
employer actually relied on [plaintiff’s] gender in making its decision,” 286
or more simply, that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff “because of” her sex. 287 What matters most, then, is not whether
the plaintiff can generate evidence of how the employer treated an opposite
sex comparator, but rather whether the plaintiff can show that her gender
motivated the employer. 288 Opposite sex comparator evidence is one
means of establishing the requisite intent, but it is not the only means. 289
284

Franchina, 881 F.3d at 52–53. See also King, 971 F. Supp. 2d at 1209, 1217
(making a similar point, and stating that permitting a defendant to escape liability for having
no comparator in its workforce “is not now, nor has it ever been, the law in [the Eleventh
C]ircuit”).
285 Franchina, 881 F.3d at 53. The court additionally declared that the City’s proposed
comparator requirement “conflicts . . . with Title VII’s text and jurisprudence.” Id. The
court explained:
Requiring a plaintiff to point to a comparator of the opposite gender implies
the inquiry is that of “but-for” causation. That is to say, the City’s approach
requires Franchina to make a showing that, all else being equal (the “plus”
factors being the same), the discrimination would not have occurred but for
her gender. Title VII requires no such proof. The text bars discrimination
when sex is “a motivating factor,” not “the motivating factor.”
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
286 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989).
287 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018) (making it unlawful for an employer to take
certain adverse actions against an individual “because of such individual’s . . . sex”); U.S.
Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (stating that “[t]he
‘factual inquiry’ in a Title VII case is ‘whether the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff’”) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981)).
288 See Goldberg, supra note 15, at 777–78 (arguing that plaintiffs ought to be able to
prove discrimination even in cases where comparison is not possible). It remains arguably
unclear whether Title VII’s “motivating factor” provision applies in so-called single motive
claims, as well as mixed motive claims. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94
n.1 (2003) (“This case does not require us to decide when, if ever, § 107 applies outside of
the mixed-motive context.”). At least two circuit courts, however, have applied the standard
in single motive claims. See Franchina, 881 F.3d at 53; Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299
F.3d 838, 853−54 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing the issue and concluding that “the plaintiff in
any Title VII case may establish a violation through a preponderance of evidence (whether
direct or circumstantial) that a protected characteristic played ‘a motivating factor’” in the
employer’s adverse action).
289 See Johnston v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, No. 08-CV-0296 PJS/RLE, 2009 WL
2900352, at *9 (D. Minn. Sept. 2, 2009); see also Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1447
n.12 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing that when “the complainant establishes by evidence that
there are no [similarly situated] males [with the same plus factor at issue] and that it is
unlikely that there would be any, then it may be that the complainant would be able to
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Finally, as between direct and circumstantial evidence, Title VII does
not require, or even prefer, one or the other when proving the ultimate fact
of discrimination. This much was made clear in the 1991 amendments to
Title VII, which set forth a “motivating factor” standard without any
mention of direct or circumstantial evidence, 290 as well as the Supreme
Court’s subsequent ruling in Desert Palace, which held that direct evidence
of discrimination is not required to prove a mixed motive claim. 291 It is
also reflected in standard jury instructions that ascribe the same weight to
direct and circumstantial evidence. 292 Moreover, although courts have
traditionally channeled direct and indirect evidence into distinct
frameworks,293 more recent decisions have begun allowing a plaintiff to
present both types of evidence in a unified attempt to prove the requisite
discriminatory intent.294 In sum, evidence is evidence, and what matters
most is its relevancy and persuasiveness, regardless of its label. 295
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has considered the role of comparator evidence in proving
sex-plus discrimination. Although some courts have declared that sex-plus
plaintiffs can never be successful without proof of how the employer
treated the corresponding subclass of opposite sex individuals, this is
analytically incorrect and should not be adopted as the law, given that there
are other forms of evidence equally capable of proving the requisite
discriminatory intent. Nevertheless, in those instances when a sex-plus
plaintiff attempts to prove her claim solely through comparator evidence,
prevail by providing some other evidence of discrimination”), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332
(2d Cir. 1997).
290 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m); Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 98–99. See also Costa, 299
F.3d at 853–54 (concluding that “the plaintiff in any Title VII case may establish a violation
through a preponderance of evidence (whether direct or circumstantial) that a protected
characteristic played ‘a motivating factor’” in the employer’s adverse action).
291 See Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101–02; Costa, 299 F.3d at 853–54.
292 See ELEVENTH CIR. P ATTERN J URY INSTR. - CIV . § 3.3 (2019) (defining “direct” and
“circumstantial” evidence and explaining that “[t]here’s no legal difference in the weight
you may give to either direct or circumstantial evidence”).
293 See, e.g., Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-11977-DT, 2007
WL 907822 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007).
294 See, e.g., Oritz v. Werner Enter. Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765–66 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding,
in part, that courts in the Seventh Circuit “must stop separating ‘direct’ from ‘indirect’
evidence and proceeding as if they were subject to different legal standards,” and stating
that “all evidence belongs in a single pile and must be evaluated as a whole”).
295 See generally Johnston v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, No. 08-CV-0296 PJS/RLE, 2009
WL 2900352, at *9 (D. Minn. Sept. 2, 2009). Cf. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 100 (quoting
Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n.17 (1957)) (“The reason for treating
circumstantial and direct evidence alike is both clear and deep rooted: ‘Circumstantial
evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than
direct evidence.’”).
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opposite sex comparator evidence is vital because without such evidence, it
would be impossible to prove that the plaintiff’s sex played a factor in the
employer’s decision, a necessary component of any sex discrimination
claim. When combined with opposite sex comparator evidence, same sex
comparator evidence can then be used to prove that the employer does not
engage in sex discrimination across-the-board, but rather employs a more
specific sex-based animus targeting only a particular subgroup of male or
female employees, thereby establishing the claim as a sex-plus claim rather
than a pure sex discrimination claim. For this reason, this Article has
shown that the strongest sex-plus discrimination claims are those where the
two types of comparator evidence are used in tandem, an approach courts
should more readily allow.

